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In this Article, Messrs. Alford and Birenbaum examine laws and regu-
lations recentlypromulgated by the People's Republic of China to govern the
conduct of business and investment in China. After establishing the cultural,
historical, bureaucratic and developmental contexts within which the authors
believe these laws and regulations must be understood, they comprehensively
examine and discuss the new legal pronouncements.
The announcement, two years ago, of The Law of the People's Re-
public of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Invest-
ment (Joint Venture Law)' was greeted with much fanfare in the West.
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1 Zhonghua Renmin Gungheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa (The Law of the People's
Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment), adopted at the
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979 and formally issued and
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To old China traders, would-be China lawyers and expectant China
businesspersons, this pathfinding legislation promised new and even
exotic opportunities to do business in the world's most populous na-
tion.2 To date, however, the promise remains largely unfulfilled. As of
this writing, few foreign investors have been able to avail themselves of
the invitation to do business in China (PRC).
Fortunately for all concerned, the romantic view of this new open-
ing to China has been replaced by a more realistic assessment of the
burdens as well as the benefits to be gained through engaging China in
commercial entente.3 This is, therefore, a good time to analyze the
problems and possibilities presented by China's conditional receptive-
ness to foreign investment.
At the outset, we would like to make plain our bias as to method-
ology. In our view, one cannot meaningfully undertake to study con-
temporary Chinese legal developments by simply dissecting statutory
language, such as the Joint Venture Law, as if it stood alone, isolated
from the rich context of Chinese thought and experience.4 We will,
therefore, examine the cultural, historical, bureaucratic, developmen-
tal, and statutory contexts of the Joint Venture Law as a prelude to
analyzing its limitations and suggesting steps a potential foreign inves-
tor should take in structuring his approach toward the Chinese. For, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, the Joint Venture Law and related Chinese
laws governing foreign investment must be construed as one would a
constitution: their significance is "to be gathered not simply by taking
the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line
of their growth."5
THE CULTURAL CONTEXT
The first and most basic aspect to be considered in evaluating the
made effective on July 8, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Joint Venture Law]. The Chinese text may be
found in Remin Ribao (People's Daily), July 9, 1979, at 1. A translation by Xinhua, the New
China News Agency, may be found at 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1163, 1163-65 (1979). Editor's
Note: The Pinyin system for romanizing Chinese names and titles will be used throughout this
article, except where that would create confusion due to customary usage.
2 China Trade with PRC Could Trple, Council President Says [1979] 237 INT'L TRADE RE-
PORTER'S U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-5; DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, GIST: US-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1979); Surrey &
Soble, Chinese Removing Joint Venture Investment Barriers, Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 22,
1979, at 19; U.S.-China Trade Seen Soaring, J. COM., Jan. 22, 1980, at 10.
3 Birenbaum & Afford, China's Law on Joint Ventures - The First Year in Review, NAT'L L.
3., July 21, 1980, at 26.
4 Birenbaum, Doing Business With China, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1979, at 6, col. 3.
5 Gompers v. U.S., 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
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Joint Venture Law is the attitude of the Chinese toward law itself. One
of the clearest continuities between classical and Communist China is a
common disdain for law as a means of regulating society. An ancient
Chinese fable has it that law was the creation of barbarian peoples liv-
ing beyond the reach of China and its civilized culture.7 For them,
behavior could be governed only by means of rigid external guidelines.
This is not to say that ancient China did not develop a system of law
worthy of comparison with that of classical Greece or other societies.
Indeed, it has been argued, on the basis of documentary evidence, that
such a system may have existed as early as the reign of the Western
Zhou (1122-700 B.C.).8 Chinese archaeologists have, in the past dec-
ade, found bamboo slips containing portions of cases that can be traced
back to the 3rd century B.C.9 Nonetheless, the perception of law as an
alien and dubious instrument was widely held throughout Chinese his-
tory.'
0
Confucianism did much to reinforce, if not actually create, this
general perception of law.'" The words of Confucius stress that in a
properly ordered society the emperor and the people adhere to mutu-
ally reinforcing standards of behavior appropriate to their roles.' 2
Thus, the emperor leads by force of example and moral suasion, rather
than power and punishment. The people follow, not out of fear but
because, through education and self-cultivation, they have internalized
the i, which are the norms of social intercourse appropriate to their
particular stations in life.' 3 Laws, being fixed and external, should
have little place in a well-governed society.' 4 Nor can law possibly
serve as a substitute for fi, for if all that interdicts improper behavior is
a set of written rules, Confucian doctrine holds that unworthy but
crafty persons will be certain to find a way around them. As Confucius
6 V. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS (1978).
7 This tale is from the SHU JING (THE BOOK OF DOCUMENTS), one of the five fundamental
works of Chinese culture, dating from the 2nd Century B.C., known as the five Classics. See The
Book ofDocuments, 22 BULLETIN OF THE MUSEUM OF FAR EASTERN ANTIQUITIES 84 (B. Karl-
gren trans. 1950).
8 H. CREEL, THE ORIGINS OF STATECRAFT IN CHINA, VOLUME ONE: THE WESTERN CHOU
161-195 (1970). Indeed, it has even been suggested that elements of a legal system existed as early
as the Shang dynasty (1766-1122 B.C.). See K. C. CHANG, SHANG CIVILIZATION 201-205 (1981).
9 THE T'ANG CODE: VOLUME I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 7 (W. Johnson trans. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Johnson].
10 See LI, note 6 supra; Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, reprinted in J. COHEN,
THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION
62-70 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
11 Id
12 THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS (2 vols.) (A. Waley trans. 1958).
13 Id, Book IL
14 Id
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himself said: "[G]overn the people by regulations, keep order among
them by chastisements, and they will flee from you and lose all self-
respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order among them by ritual
[fi] and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own
accord.""i
The dangers the Confucians saw of relying upon law as a primary
tool of governance were borne out with the rise in the 3rd century B.C.
of the state of Qin, a semi-barbaric people residing just beyond the
Yellow River basin, the core of classical Chinese civilization. The Qin
relied heavily upon the "rule of law," not to protect the rights of the
individual, but rather to regiment a strict, martial society. 16 All per-
sons, save for the Qin emperor were regulated by imperial decree. 17
Although the Qin succeeded where others had failed in bringing the
warring states of the Yellow River region together into a single unified
empire (hence, the name China), their hegemony was short-lived-a
fact that the Confucians have been quick to ascribe in large measure to
reliance on law to regulate behavior.18
Not long after the demise of the Qin, the views espoused by Con-
fucius and his followers became state orthodoxy. Ensconsed under the
patronage of the Emperor Han Wudi (who reigned from 140 to 87
B.C.), this new dogma held grip over the people for a remarkably long
period. 19 In effect, the new orthodoxy became a cloak of legitimacy to
be worn by all who aspired seriously to govern China throughout the
imperial period until the final collapse of Imperial China in 1911.20
With the assumption of responsibility for governance, Confucian
oriented scholar-officials from the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220)
onward had little choice but to deal with law.2' The Han commenced
the preparation of a comprehensive legal code,22 known as the Zhi-
uzhang lu, that served as a basis for the Sui (A.D. 581-617) and T'ang
15 Id. Book II at 3.
16 To the extent that the Qin had a coherent ideology, it was best expounded by Han Fei-tzu
(280?-233 B.C.). See THE COMPLETE WORKS OF HAN FEI-Tzu (2 vols.) (W. K. Liao trans. 1939
and 1959). For a thorough account of the Qin, see D. BODDE, CHINA'S FIRST UNIFIER: A STUDY
OF THE CH'IN DYNASTY As SEEN IN THE LIFE OF LI Ssu 280?-208 B.C. (1938).
17 See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 23-29 (1967); F. MOTE, INTELLEC-
TuAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINA 111-128 (1971).
18 SsU-MA CH'IEN: GRAND HISTORIAN OF CHINA 33 (B. Watson trans. 1958).
19 CH'U T'UNG-Tsu (Qu TONGZU), LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA, 280-289 and
passim (1961) [hereinafter cited as Qu].
20 Id. See also Schwartz, supra note 10, at 62-65.
21 A. HULSEWE, REMNANTS OF HAN LAW, 4-94 (1954).
22 Id.
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(A.D. 618-907) codes. These codes in turn proved to be models, in both
format and content, for subsequent Chinese codes through the Qing
dynasty (A.D. 1644-1911), as well as for Japanese, Korean and
Vietnamese codes.
2 3
But as Qu Tongzu and others have shown, in turning to law, and
in ultimately developing a sophisticated legal system, Confucian
scholar-officials of the Han and later dynasties did not merely see their
function as that of applying abstract, objective rules.24 Rather, they
"confucianized" the law, molding it to reflect and reinforce Confucian
norms." As the famed early Qing scholar Gu Yenwu (A.D. 1613-1682)
wrote:
[W]hen our predecessors initiated legislation, they could not thoroughly
study the facts and circumstances and prepare in advance for future revi-
sion. Their successors followed what was already a corrupt practice, and
were restricted by the established statutes which they could not change, or
had to make by-laws, to amend them. Thereupon the more numerous the
laws, the more they were abused. All the affairs of the empire became
more vexatious. The result was that the laws were not understood and
not enforced.26
This result was to be avoided by substituting precept for prescription,
while retaining the formal structure of law without which it would not
be possible to govern effectively.
The disdain of ancient Confucian ideologues for law, notwith-
standing their adroit use of it, has been matched by that of their latter-
day Communist counterparts.27 To be sure, building upon the laws de-
veloped in the Zhiangxi Soviet and later in the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia
and Shaanxi-Chahar-Hobei border regions, the Communists strove in
the early years of the PRC to use law as an aid in consolidating the
revolution and achieving its goals.28 Indeed, in their first four years in
power, China's Communist rulers promulgated major new laws con-
cerning subjects ranging from marriage to the ownership of industrial
enterprises to political offenses. 29 But, ultimately, Communist mistrust
of the Nationalist-trained legal professionals and populist impatience
with "experts," generally coalesced with and reinforced traditional Chi-
23 Having published his translation of the General Principles section of the Tang Code, Wal-
lace Johnson is presently translating the remainder of the Code. Johnson, supra note 9.
24 See BODDE & MoRus, supra note 17, at 27-29.
25 [d
26 Gu Yenwu, quoted in S. Y. TENG & J. FAIRBANK, CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST 9
(1954).
27 See LI, supra note 6, at 1-21.
28 Lubman, Form and Function in the Chinese Criminal Process, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 535, 536-
540 (1969).
29 See Cohen, supra note 10.
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nese attitudes.30 Consequently, within the PRC, law was largely deem-
phasized as an effective instrument for accomplishing social change
until the late 1970's.31
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
China's experience with the West over the past two centuries rein-
forced ancient Chinese antipathy toward foreigners and heightened
Chinese suspicions about the role of law. From their first contact with
the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century until the Opium War (1839-
1842), China's rulers sought to cordon off and control commercial and
other interaction with the West.32 Foreign merchants were restricted to
a temporary presence-without spouses and for no more than the four
to five month trading season-in small compounds located on an island
in the metropolis of Canton, itself a corner of China remote from the
capital. All trade had to be carried on through a small circle of
merchants, known collectively as the "Hoppo.' ' 33 To the constant frus-
tration of state chartered trading companies-such as the British East
India Company-and their national governments, direct dealings with
the Chinese government, as well as with Chinese producers and con-
sumers, were barred.34
The pact settling the Opium War intensified Chinese hostility toL
ward Western institutions. Under pressure from aggressive English
traders, the British prevailed upon the Chinese to grant a series of con-
cessions, including year-round access to five major coastal ports, the
authority to contact Chinese officials directly, the extension of British
law to Her Majesty's subjects in China, and all other privileges that
might in the future be granted to any other foreign power.35 During
30 See Li, supra note 6, at 22-32.
31 Since 1978, the Chinese have turned increasingly to law as a means through which to stabi-
lize and organize society. During this period the Chinese have issued numerous laws and regula-
tions, -including the PRC's first substantive criminal code, a code of criminal procedure, an
environmental law, regulations regarding lawyers, regulations regarding foreign offices in China
and, as will be discussed, various laws and regulations regarding joint ventures and related com-
mercial activities. See text accompanying notes 118-343 infra; Lubman, New Developments in Law
in the People'r Republic of China, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 122 (1980); Alford, Law and Chinese
Foreign Trade, 28 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 81 (1979).
32 Wills, Ch'ing Relations i7th the Dutch, 1662-1690, in THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER 225 (J.
Fairbank ed. 1968); J. Fairbank, The Earl Treay System in the Chinese World Order, in id. at
257.
33 Edwards, The Old Canton System of Foreign Trade, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOR-
EIGN TRADE 360 (V. Li ed. 1977).
34 Id.
35 The Treaty of Nanking is found in L. HERTSLET, VI HERTSLET'S COMMERCIAL TREATInES
221-225 (1908). See H. MoRSE, I INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 298-341
(1910).
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the remainder of the 19th century, Great Britain, as well as the United
States, France, Germany, Japan and Russia, not to mention more than
a dozen lesser nations,3 6 continued to expand this list of territorial and
jurisdictional concessions. 37 By 1900, the once proud Middle Kingdom
had been carved up into a number of smaller spheres dominated by
Western and Japanese "barbarians." 38 These foreign powers were not
above using law and, particularly, their concept of extraterritorial legal
privilege, to promote their various diplomatic, financial, commercial
and religious objectives.
On the diplomatic front, the foreign powers insisted that China
abandon her traditional practice of conducting foreign relations
through the "tribute system," under which all other states owed fealty
to China.39 Instead, the Chinese were forced to deal with these powers
according to "modern" legal principles.4 ° Yet, at the same time, Great
Britain, Germany and others invoked international law to justify the
seizure of suzerainty over Chinese territory and the imposition of their
own laws upon China.4 Financially, China found herself having to
surrender control over her most vital source of revenue-the Imperial
Customs4 2- and to make numerous other concessions to satisfy a vari-
ety of obligations to Western governments, including payment of heavy
reparations.43 Commercially, Western merchants in Shanghai and
other treaty ports competed energetically with their Chinese counter-
parts.n" In that effort, they were advantaged not only by mbre ad-
vanced business techniques, but by military power in the form of
Western forces on Chinese soil, and legal privileges such as virtual im-
36 The extraterritorial privileges exacted by those nations are described in W. FISHEL, THE
END OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA 1-50 (1952). Many of the treaties embodying these
relations are reproduced in TREATIES BETWEEN THE EMPIRE OF CHINA AND FOREIGN POWERS
(W. Meyers ed. 1877).
37 FISHEL, supra note 36, at 1-50.
38 Id.
39 Under this system, China was the center of civilization, to which all other states, at least
nominally, paid tribute.
40 j. FAIRBANK, TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST: THE OPENING OF THE
TREATY PORTS 1842-1854 96-98 (1964).
41 1. Hsu, CHINA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS: THE DIPLOMATIC PHASE 1858-
1880 (1960); Hsin, "flat Does Bourgeois International Law Explain About the Question of Interven-
tion?, in Kuo-CHi WEN-TI YEN-CHIU (1960), quoted in J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 139-172 (1974).
42 J. SPENCE, To CHANGE CHINA: WESTERN ADVISORS IN CHINA 1620-1960 93-128 (1969).
43 M. YOUNG, THE RHETORIC OF EMPIRE: AMERICAN CHINA 1895-1901 172-218 (1968).
44 CHI SHU-FEN, JINGJI GINLUEXIA ZHI ZHUNGGUO (ECONOMIC AGGRESSION IN CHINA)
(1925) recounts numerous specific instances of foreign economic activity in China aided by extra-
territoriality.
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munity from suit under Chinese law.a" At the same time, foreign mis-
sionaries held out to potential Chinese converts not only the promise of
divine salvation but also of valuable, if worldly, exemptions from Chi-
nese law.46
Not surprisingly, the Chinese came to resent bitterly this Western
presence.4 7 Although the Chinese attempted on occasion to use inter-
national law to fend off excessive incursions into their sovereignty,48
they came generally to regard the West's laws as little more than weap-
ons used by the powerful to advance their interests. As the noted Chi-
nese diplomat Tsui Kuo-ying said in 1891: "[llnternational law is just
like Chinese statutory law-reasonable but unreliable. If there is right
without might, the right will not prevail."49
Nor did these sentiments diminish, even after the Qing was top-
pled in 1911 and a Chinese republic established. In the words of a
handbill circulated by a group of Cantonese student activists in the
1920's:
[A] cursory glance at the treaties which bind China today will readily
show how unequal they are .... These unequal treaties ... [have] for
a long time relegated China to a position worse than an enslaved col-
ony .... Thus it has been possible to permit even a common foreign
policeman to exercise the power of killing and wounding Chinese citizens
on their home soil.50
The antipathy toward the West-and particularly toward its com-
mercial and legal presence and practices--expressed by these Canton-
ese students was echoed by the leaders of China's Communist
Revolution. Mao Zedong, himself, wrote in 1939:
[T]he imperialist powers have forced China to sign numerous unequal
treaties by which they have acquired the right to station land and sea
forces and exercise consular jurisdiction, and they have carved up the
whole country into imperialist spheres of influence .... [They] have
gained control of all the important trading ports in China by these une-
qual treaties and have marked off areas in many of these ports as conces-
sions under their direct administration. They have also gained control of
45 Id See S. COCHRAN, BIG BUSINESS IN CHINA: SINO-FOREIGN RIVALRY IN THE CIGA-
RETrE INDUSTRY 1890-1930 (1979); A. FEUERWERKER, CHINA'S EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION
(1958).
46 .Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 461-463 (1970). See P. COHEN, CHINA AND CHRIS-
TIANrrYpazi7m (1963).
47 Id See CHI, supra note 44.
48 In 1864, for example, the Tsungli Yamen (the equivalent of Qing China's foreign ministry)
under the leadership of Prince Kung used Henry Wheaton's treatise ELEMENTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW to persuade the Prussians to relinquish a Danish ship they had seized in Chinese
waters. See Hsu, supra note 41, at 132-145; TENG & FAIRBANK, supra note 26, at 96-98.
49 COHEN & CHIu, supra note 41, at 10.
50 33 CHINA WEEKLY REV. 182-183 (Aug. 8, 1925).
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China's customs, foreign trade and communications.. 
Within three years after the creation of the PRC, all commercial
enterprises owned by United States citizens and other foreigners were
nationalized.52 Nearly all Westerners fled or were imprisoned. 3 At
the same time, a new foreign elite began to emerge, composed of Rus-
sian advisers who gained a status akin to that which Western merchants
once enjoyed. 4 Not until the final, abrupt withdrawal of the Russians
by 1960 was China at last free of a privileged class of foreigners. 5
THE BUREAUCRATIC CONTEXT
If the Chinese did not invent bureaucracy, they were among its
earliest and most enthusiastic practitioners. 6 Notwithstanding the ef-
forts of Chairman Mao and others to keep the bureaucracy in line, its
influence over the translation of policy into practice remains decisive to
this day.57 Indeed, the most difficult task facing joint ventures may be
to mesh what is meant to be an autonomous corporate entity with a
state-controlled economy governed by bureaucrats.
Imperial bureaucrats tended to govern with an eye toward promot-
ing Confucian values, which placed heavy emphasis upon the mainte-
nance of harmony and the preservation of order and rank. 8 The
present Chinese bureaucracy applies what might best be characterized
as a mixture of socialist principles and bureaucratic conservatism.5 9 In
so doing, the PRC's mammoth bureaucracy is functioning in almost
contradictory fashion, promoting socialist change in theory while
retarding it in practice through bureaucratic inertia and rigidity.60
Although the state, party and military bureaucracies all play roles
in the formation and administration of the economic plans that guide
China today, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that few peo-
ple outside, or indeed, inside China really know how the plans are
51 MAO TsE-TUNG, 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 311 (1965).
52 T. Thompson, China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capital-
ism: 1949-57 (Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 6, 1979).
53 Id.
54 J. GITTINGS, SURVEY OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE 1963-1967 129-143 (1968).
55 Id.
56 H. Creel, The Beginnings of Bureaucracy in China: The Origin of the Hsien, 23 J. ASIAN
STUDIES 155 (1964).
57 J. Mathews, China's Bureaucracy: Centuries of Training of Obfuscation, Wash. Post, Apr. 10,
1980, § A, at 17.
58 J. WAiT, THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 78-98 (1972).
59 See F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (2d ed. 1968).
60 A. ECKSTEIN, CHINA'S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 92-93 (1977). [Hereinafter cited as Eck-
stein].
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made and operate. Prominent Western analysts of China's economy
61
suggest that data on basic economic needs and capabilities filters up-
ward from individual enterprises through state, party, and military
committees, which tend to have overlapping membership, especially at
the higher levels. 2 Sectional plans are then prepared by a relatively
high level state elite, particularly in the State Planning Commission,
State Economic Commission, State Agricultural Commission and State
Capital Construction Commission.63 Once the plans have been formu-
lated, directives based upon them are developed.64 As these directives
are considered within the bureaucracy, they become increasingly de-
tailed, fixed and inflexible.
Not surprisingly, performance on both the macro and micro levels
has fallen short of the planned mark.65 Witness the shortages and dis-
tribution problems China has experienced during the past three de-
cades.66 Witness also the seeming heresy of the need for professional
middlemen (caigouyuan) whose unofficial but indispensable function is
to enable the economy to work by procuring needed supplies not allot-
ted by the state plan and disposing of production in excess of the state
plan .6  As such, these traders, or "fixers," supply a market correction
force for the system.6 8 Nonetheless, available evidence indicates that
during the past twenty years state plans have determined the general
manner and scope of operation of the vast majority of China's indus-
trial enterprises.6 9 Vital decisions that have been made routinely pur-
suant to the state plans or related directives include access to
61 Id.; C. HOWE, CHINA'S ECONOMY: A BASIC GUIDE 30-65 (1978); A. DONNITHORNE,
CHINA'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM 457-511 (1967); N. LARDY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION
IN CHINA 137-172 (1978).
62 J. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS 92-126 (1980).
63 China's State Economic Commission (SEC), CHINA Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1979, at 16-17; The
Role and Functions of China's Commissions, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 14.
64 Often the plans are not made public until well after their effective date. ECKSTEIN, supra
note 60, at 111-112.
65 Chen, Economic Modernization in Post-Mao China" Policies, Problems and Prospects, in
CHINESE ECONOMY POST MAO: A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT ECO-
NOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 165 (J. Hardt ed. 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hardt].
66 Dernberger & Fasenfart, China's Post-Mao Economic Future, in Hardt, supra note 65, at 8-
16; Qian Junrai, Readjusting and Restructuring the Chinese Economy (unpublished paper avail-
able through the co-authors).
67 DONNITHORNE, supra note 61, at 290-291; Butler, China's Host of BuyingAgents Patch Up
Oversight of Planning, Asian Wall St. J., July 25, 1978, at 8; Butterfield, China Gingerly Gives
Private Business a Try, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § E, at 3.
68 Butterfield, supra note 67, at 3.
69 Id
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"investment capital,"7 specific sources of supply for needed raw mater-
ials and utilities, availability of labor (or, more typically, the number of
workers a plant would be required to take on),7' product mix, projected
output, pricing, profitability and assigned "customers."72 Individual
industrial entities, in effect, have been left with little operational discre-
tion.73
In recent years, however, China began gradually to decentralize
decision making in the economic sphere. 74 Local governments, plants
and other enterprises were given broader power and concomitant re-
sponsibility for its exercise. 75 For example, in the large and important
province of Sichuan, Deng Xiaoping's birthplace, which Zhao Ziyang
headed and used as an economic laboratory prior to assuming the pre-
miership in September of 1980, many enterprises have been "free" to
earn a profit, raise their own investment capital, select product lines in
addition to those required by the state plan, market over-the-quota pro-
duction, and utilize excess earnings for worker incentives, better worker
benefits, advertising, reinvestment, or the direct acquisition abroad of
needed foreign equipment.76 Astute Western observers saw Zhao's ele-
vation as evidence that the Sichuan experience might become the fore-
runner of a nation-wide experimentation with market oriented
mechanisms.77 As of this writing, the accuracy of that prediction and
the likelihood that China's movement toward decentralization will sur-
vive remain very much in doubt, as the PRC continues to veer between
its mercantilist and Maoist pasts.78
THE DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT
In January of 1975, Premier Zhou Enlai called upon the Fourth
National People's Congress to embark upon a comprehensive develop-
mental program that by the year 2000 would upgrade Chinese agricul-
70 Id
71 EcKSTEIN, supra note 60, at 101-104.
72 Id at 100-101.
73 Id at 86-158.
74 Qian Junrai, supra note 66, at 9-11; China's Slow Turn Toward a Free Market System, Bus.
WEEK, May 19, 1980, at 46.
75 Ching, China's Choice ofNew Premier Indicates a Desire to Break with Mao 's Policies, Wall
St. J., Aug. 29, 1980, at 17.
76 Weil, Sichuan Province, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 31; Tian Yun, More Authority
for Enterprises Revives the Economy, BEUINO REv., Apr. 6, 1981, at 21-29.
77 Clarke, Leadership Divisions, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 43-46; Ching, supra
note 75.
78 Butterfield, China at a Fork in the Road" How Much ofthe West Does it Want, N.Y. Times,
May 11, 1980, at 10, col. 1.
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ture, industry, national defense and science to a level comparable to
that of the world's great powers.7 9 As a first step toward realizing this
program, known as the Four Modernizations, the Chinese launched in
1976 a ten-year plan for development of the national economy. 0
Down-playing the emphasis upon self-reliant socialist development
that had characterized previous five- and ten-year plans,"1 the 1976-85
version set as China's goals for the decade the construction of one hun-
dred and twenty major new infrastructure projects, including thirty
electric power generating stations, ten steel complexes, eight coal fields,
six trunk railways, five harbors, and an assortment of other projects,
including fertilizer plants, communications satellites and color televi-
sion, integrated circuitry and truck factories.8 2
When finally made public in 1978, China's 1976-85 ten-year plan
received enthusiastic reviews abroad and at home.8 3 Foreign govern-
ments and companies, recognizing that tremendous infusions of foreign
cipital, heavy equipment and technology would be necessary to accom-
plish China's developmental goals, and facing sluggish demand for the
most part in their home markets, they vied for access to the Chinese
market. 4 On the financial side, in the year following Chairman Hua's
initial exposition of the plan, government developmental banks and
private institutions in Europe and Japan seeking to take advantage of
China's reputation for credit-worthiness, offered to make more than
$26 billion of generally low-interest, long-term financing85 available to
the PRC, which had previously eschewed the assumption of foreign
debt. 6 During that same period, the governments of Japan and France
concluded agreements with the PRC calling for billions of dollars
worth of trade.87 For the most part, these agreements provided for the
exchange of oil, coal and other raw or semi-finished materials for ad-
79 Zhou Enlai, Report on the Work ofthe Government (delivered at the First Session of the
Fourth National People's Congress), reprinted in BEuJING REV., Jan. 24, 1975, at 21-25.
80 Hua Guofeng, Report on the Work of the Government (delivered at the First Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress), reprinted in BEuINO REv., Mar. 10, 1978, at 7-40.
81 Id
82 Id
83 Chen, supra note 65.
84 Huan Xiang, Western Economy in the 1980's, BEMNG REV., May 4, 1981, at 16-19.
85 China Won't Use Its Vast Credits at Foreign Banks, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1980, at 30, col. I;
M. Liu, Rock-bottom Terms are a Murstfor Foreigners, FAR E. EcON. REV. Sept. 21, 1979, at 61-63.
86 N. Lardy, Recent Chinese Economic Peformance and Prospectsfor the Ten- Year Plan, in
Hardt, .supra note 65, at 50.
87 Chi=na A Precarious Piecemeal and Feeble Presence, FAR E. EcON. REv. Apr. 27, 1979, at
44-46; China Fixes Long-Term TradeAgreements to Ten- Year Plan, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr.
1979, at 69. China Shoklcu Hits fapan-'Teware of Getting Duped W/hen Developing Foreign
Trade," CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 68-69 [hereinafter cited China Shokku].
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vanced industrial equipment and data."8 Countless private compa-
nies--offering everything from oil drilling equipment to disco
records-also sought to sell their wares in China.89
The impact of Chairman Hua's invitation to foreign business to-
gether with the opening of direct access to Chinese producers and con-
sumers took the Chinese leadership by surprise.9" Finding themselves
with far greater access to the West than had previously been the case,
ministries, provincial and local governmental authorities and even in-
dividual factories competed for sorely needed foreign technology and
supplies.9 ' It soon became apparent to the leadership that China was
unable to evaluate, allocate and absorb the full scope of what she was
being offered.92 Moreover, China's limited foreign exchange holdings,
estimated variously at $2 to $7 billion, were clearly inadequate to cover
all the imports.93
Rather than incurring heavy foreign debt to make up the shortfall,
the leadership decided in early 1979 to postpone implementation of the
ten-year plan in order to enter into a period, intended originally to last
through 1981, but now likely to extend at least until 1983, during which
China's goals could be reassessed and her priorities clearly estab-
lished.94 The first and most dramatic result of this period of "readjust-
ment," as the Chinese have characterized it, was the suspension,
announced in February of 1979, of preliminary arrangements with Jap-
anese companies for steel mills, coal mine development and major un-
dertakings in heavy industry.95 These projects had called for aggregate
expenditures of more than $2 billion.96 Over the course of the next four
months, British, French, German, United States and additional Japa-
nese companies were informed of delays in the construction of nuclear
power plants, iron ore processing facilities and international class ho-
88 Id.
89 Chen, Spotlight on U.S.-P.A C. Trade.- Review of 1978 Transactions and Prospectsfor Ex-
pansion, Bus. AM., Sept. 24, 1979, at 8-10.
90 Rowan, China Halts U.S. Mine, Petrochemical Deals, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1981, § D, at 1.
91 Prior to 1978, most foreign trade negotiations were conducted by China's state foreign trad-
ing corporations. Approximately a dozen in number, those corporations interposed themselves
between foreign business and Chinese producing and consuming entities. Since 1978, their impor-
tance has diminished, although their numbers have grown.
92 China Economic Notes, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1979, at 48-50.
93 Stepanek, A Ten Year Profile ofthe Bank of China, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct., 1979, at
42.
94 Stepanek, China's New Economic Priorities, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1979, at 36; Hey,
Big Spender, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 14, 1981, at 83.
95 China Shokku, supra note 87, at 68.
96 China Readjusts, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 4-5.
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tels.9 7 These decisions effectively ended the honeymoon phase of the
opening to the West, as the Chinese came to appreciate the hard trade-
offs that had to be made in rationing one of their most precious and
limited resources: foreign exchange. With that, Western exporters
were forced to recognize that China could hardly hope to buy all they
had to sell.98
The reappraisal of priorities has produced a significant change in
direction. In place of the major capital construction projects previously
planned, attention has been focused increasingly on "light industry,"
Chinese-style, a classification that encompasses many projects that
would be considered "heavy" if undertaken in the West.99 With the
exception of such vital fields as agriculture, energy, and transportation,
emphasis is now being placed on projects with the potential to generate
foreign exchange rapidly."°
This policy is intended to produce political as well as economic
payoffs. The shift toward light industry means more "plums" to dis-
tribute throughout the country in the form of projects capable of ab-
sorbing large numbers of China's growing unemployed and
underemployed, and of producing those consumer goods that China's
workers lately have been encouraged to expect.' 0 ' Thus, Deng and his
colleagues hope to begin to deliver on their promise to provide a better
material life; a promise which Deng, although not a charismatic leader
in the manner of Mao, is under considerable pressure to fulfill.0 2
China's determination to limit spending on imports to foreign ex-
change earned through exports and to concentrate foreign investment
in light industry was repeatedly underscored throughout the Third Ses-
sion of the Fifth National People's Congress, held in September of 1980
in Beijing.'0 3 Delivering the "Report on Financial Work," the Minister
of Finance, Wang Bingqian, criticized the fact that China's projected
deficit for 1980 would surpass $4 billion, notwithstanding proposed
97 How Companies Can Respond to China's Slowdown, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1979, at
37-40.
98 Letterfrom Peking, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 18, 1980, at 82.
99 China Trade Profts Hard to Come By, J. COM., Nov. 19, 1980, at 1.
100 Id
101 CBR Interview: Vice Premier Bo Yibo on China's Current Priorities, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 11; China Unable to Attain High Industrial Status by 2000, J. CoM., June 27,
1980, at 30.
102 Hsia & Haun, Chinar Joint Venture Law: Part 11, I CHINA L. REP. 61, 78-83 (1981).
103 MAIN DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1980) [hereinafter cited as MAIN DOCUMENTS].
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belt-tightening measures' 04 that would promote greater accountability
in borrowing and thus reduce China's debt.'0 5 The foreign exchange
saved would become available for development of light industry.
0 6
Wang's message was reinforced in key addresses by outgoing Premier
Hua Guofeng 1°7 and by the new Chairman of the State Planning Com-
mission, Vice Premier Yao Ilin.'08
Developments since the September 1980 session of the Congress
have made it clear that the Chinese leadership meant what it said.
Hundreds of millions of dollars of orders have been cancelled or post-
poned.109 The most celebrated of the project cutbacks is the Baoshan
steel complex." 0 Launched in 1978 with great fanfare, the Baoshan
project was planned to include a cold rolling steel mill, a hot strip steel
mill, an iron ore sintering plant, a continuous tubing mill and a chemi-
cal plant, as well as new port and rail facilities to connect Baoshan to
nearby Shanghai and other key ports."' The project, with much of its
equipment and technology to come from Japanese, German and, to a
lesser extent, U.S. firms, had an initial projected cost of more than $5
billion." 2 But, as has happened with a number of other major capital
projects, the estimates proved low; projected needs for the complex's
output appeared too high, and unexpected difficulties-particularly re-
lated to infrastructure-were all too abundant.' 13 The result was that
Baoshan was both a severe problem in itself and an embarrassing sym-
bol of the shortcomings in the developmental course embarked upon
only two years earlier. In late November of 1980, the Chinese in-
formed Nippon Steel and other key suppliers that phase II of the pro-
ject, which had been intended to double the complex's capacity to 6
million tons per year, had been postponed indefinitely." 4 In January
of 1981, much of the rest of the Baoshan endeavor was halted, prompt-
104 Wang Bingqian, Report on the Final State Accountsfor 1979, the Draft State Budgetfor 1980
andthe Financial Estiaatesfor 1981, in MAIN DOCUMENTS, supra note 103, at 48-85; Bonavia, The
Red Ink on China's Ledger, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 5, 1980, at 69.
105 See Wang, supra note 104, at 77-85.
106 Id
107 Hua Guofeng, Speech at the Third Session of the Ffth National People's Congress, in MAIN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 103, at 143-201.
108 Yao Ilin, Report on the Arrangementsfor the National Economic Plansfor 1980 and 1981, in
MAIN DOCUMENTS, supra note 103, at 5-47.
109 Chinese Bullin a China Shop, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1981 at 78. [Hereinafter cited as Chinese
Bull].
110 Jones, The Baoshan Contracts, CHINA Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1980, at 47.
1I Id
112 Foreign supplies and services were valued at $1.5 billion. See Rowan, supra note 90.
113 Id
114 Id
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ing the Japanese government, under pressure from Japanese firms, to
demand that China, at a minimum, compensate Japanese companies
for their "out of pocket" losses." 5 Notwithstanding the expressed in-
tent of the Chinese leadership to make just recompense in accord with
conventional international practice, negotiators have yet to work out
formulae for such payments."
6
Nor has Baoshan been the only major project subject to recent
reassessment. Agreements for the construction of chemical, fertilizer
and petrochemical plants have reportedly been deferred or cancelled,
as have contracts for many smaller purchases."
17
THE STATUTORY CONTEXT
The Joint Venture Law
The focal point of any discussion of the statutory context sur-
rounding joint ventures in the PRC, of course, is The Law on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.
China's Joint Venture Law was many months in the making.""
Aided by foreign consultants, Chinese officials examined the joint ven-
ture codes of Romania, Yugoslavia, Japan and Singapore; analyzed
what was necessary to attract foreign investment; and most impor-
tantly, considered what would best serve China's objectives. 119 The
product, effective immediately upon its promulgation on July 8, 1979,
was a three page document containing a mere fifteen broadly-worded
articles.120 Very much in keeping with the PRC's practice of general
and aspirational legislation,' 21 the Joint Venture Law is best under-
stood as an enabling act, leaving specific details and programs to be
115 Mitsubishi alone is said to have hundreds of millions of dollars worth of contracts at stake.
Mitsubishi Gets Orders From China, J. COM., Mar. 26, 1980, at 10.
116 Mitsubishi Mining to 4ssist China in Coal Venture, J. COM., Mar. 26, 1981, at 33. One im-
pediment to reaching a solution has been China's insistence on receiving more than 2.5 billion
dollars in low interest loans in return for making compensation. Chinese Aide Assures Japan on
Future Ties, Asian Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 8. Latest reports indicate that the Japanese
government has decided to provide the Chinese with a loan package worth 1.21 billion dollars to
help salvage part of phase I of the Baoshan project and other industrial undertakings using Japa-
nese supplies. Hashimoto, Japan Sets $1.21 Billion Loan Package For Chinese Steel, Petrochemical
Plants, Asian Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 3.
117 Chinese Bull, supra note 109, at 78.
118 DiFederico, China Marks New Policy with Joint VentureLaw to Encourage Investment, Bus.
Am., Aug. 27, 1979, at 18-21.
119 Id
120 See Joint Venture Law, supra note 1.
121 Hsia & Hahn, China's Joint Venture Law Part 1, 1 CHINA L. REP. 1 (1980).
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worked out either in regulations or the joint venture documents them-
selves.
In essence, the law provides for the establishment of equity joint
ventures between Chinese and foreign entities, subject to the authoriza-
tion of China's Foreign Investment Control Commission (FICC).
122
The ventures will take the form of limited liability companies.' 3 The
foreign participant must contribute at least 25% of the venture's regis-
tered capital." 4 That contribution may take any of a variety of forms,
including capital goods, industrial property rights or cash.'15 Theoreti-
cally, the foreign share can be as high as 100%.126 Profits and losses are
to be divided according to each party's capital contributions.2 7 With
the exception of the site, which the Chinese side may contribute or
lease to the venture, the value of all such contributions must be jointly
ascertained. 28 Any technology invested by the foreign party must be
both "truly advanced and appropriate to China's needs."'
2 9
Subject to the "laws, decrees and pertinent rules and regulations
of"' 30 the PRC, the joint venture is to be governed by a Board of Di-
rectors, composed of individuals chosen by each party and headed by a
Chairman appointed by the Chinese and one or two Vice Chairmen
named by the foreign participant.' 3 1 The Board is to have authority to
act on "all issues concerning the venture,"' 132 including, but not limited
to, production and business programs, labor plans and the appointment
of the president, chief engineer, treasurer and auditors. 33 However,
"the production and business programs. . . shall be filed with the au-
thority concerned and. . . shall be implemented through business con-
tracts."' 34 First priority in the acquisition of "required raw and semi-
processed materials, fuels, auxiliary equipment, etc." should be given to
Chinese sources, although a venture will be allowed to acquire such
items abroad "with its own foreign exchange.' 35
122 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 3.
123 Id art. 4.
124 Id art. 4.
125 Id art. 5.
126 Hsia & Hahn, supra note 121, at 14.
127 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 4.
128 Id art. 5.
129 Id art. 5.
130 Id art. 2.
131 Id art. 6.
132 Id art. 6.
133 Id art. 6.
134 Id art. 9.
135 Id art. 9.
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The joint venture's gross income, after deductions for worker bo-
nus and welfare funds, expansion funds and reserve funds,136 is subject
to a "joint venture income tax" imposed pursuant to the "tax laws of
the PRC."'137 Tax holidays are potentially available for joint ventures
equipped with "up-to-date technology by world standards" for the first
two to three profit-making years, 138 as are tax "incentives" for those
reinvesting net profits in China.139 Through "the legislation in force,"
the Chinese government has vowed to protect all lawful rights and in-
terests of the foreign participants including "resources invested" and
"profits due," which may be repatriated, according to the law."4
The products manufactured by a joint venture may be distributed
in China as well as abroad14' throughout the term of the venture, as
agreed upon between the parties.142 The foreign venture partner has a
right, under certain circumstances, to terminate the venture before its
expiration date, provided authorization has been received from the
proper authorities. 143 Finally, disputes are to be resolved by the Board
of Directors "through consultation by the participants on the principle
of equality and mutual benefit,"'" and if that fails, through arbitra-
tion.145
The Joint Venture Law did not evoke the level of foreign interest
the Chinese leadership initially had anticipated. 1" In some measure,
this was a consequence of the many questions the law left unan-
swered. 47 Responding to this criticism, the Chinese have accelerated
and intensified their efforts to issue laws and regulations fleshing out
the basic Joint Venture Law. To date, new laws or sets of regulations
concerning five key areas have been promulgated. These concern joint
venture income tax,14 8 personal income tax,149 labor management, 150
136 Id art. 7.
137 Id art 7.
138 Id art. 7.
139 Id art. 7.
14 Id art 2.
141 Id art. 9.
142 Id art. 9.
143 Id art. 13.
144 Id art 6.
145 1d art 14.
146 See, ag., China's Economy: Big Deals, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 1979, at 85; Fung, China, Cool
to Foreign Joint Ventures, Looks to Overseas Loans for its Projects, Asian Wall St. J., Aug. 24,
1981, at 8.
147 See Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 6.
148 Zhonghua Renmin Gungheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Suodeshuifa (Income Tax
Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign
Investment), adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (Aug. 26, 1980),
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the registration of joint ventures 1 ' and foreign exchange. 152 Work re-
portedly is progressing in other related areas, including a civil code,
civil procedure law, further foreign exchange regulations and re-
vamped patent and copyright laws.' 53 In addition, under a directive of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued on
November 29, 1979, the validity of more than 1,500 laws, regulations
and directives issued prior to 1957, many of which may have an impact
upon joint ventures, has been reaffirmed.'
54
Joint Venture Income Tax
China's Income Tax Law Concerning Joint Ventures With Chi-
nese and Foreign Investment was formulated after extensive consulta-
tion with foreign business leaders and scholars and promulgated by the
Fifteenth Session of the National People's Congress Standing Commit-
tee on August 26, 1980.'" Regulations elaborating the provisions of
this law were issued on December 14, 1980.156 Akin to the basic Joint
and formally issued and made effective on September 10, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Income Tax
Law]. A translation by Xinhua, may be found in MAIN DOCUMENTS, supra note 103, at 230.
149 Zhunghua Renmin Gungheguo Geren Suopeshuifa (Individual Income Tax Law of the
People's Republic of China), adopted by the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Con-
gress and formally issued and made effective on September 10, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Individ-
ual Income Tax Law]. A translation by Xinhua may be found in MAIN DOCUMENTS, supra note
103, at 238.
150 Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Laodong Guanli Guiding (Regulations on Labor Manage-
ment in Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign Investment), adopted at Fifteenth Session of the
National People's Congress Standing Committee and formally issued and made effective on Au-
gust 26, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Labor Management Regulations]. A translation by Xinhua may
be found at E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Oct. 15, 1980, at 26.
151 Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Denji Guanli Banfa (Regulations on the Registration of
Joint Ventures using Chinese and Foreign Investment), adopted at the Fifteenth Session of the
National People's Congress Standing Committee and formally issued and made effective on Au-
gust 26, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Registration Regulations]. A translation by Xinhua may be
found at E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Oct. 15, 1980, at 25-26.
152 Zhonghua Renmin Gungheguo Waihui Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (Provisional Regulations for
Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China),promulgated by the State Council on De-
cember 18, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Exchange Control Regulations]. A translation by Xinhua
may be found at CHINA BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 49-50.
153 See Alford, note 31 supra, at 83-84. The Chinese have also recently promulgated regula-
tions governing the activities of lawyers and local offices of foreign businesses.
154 Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Nov. 30, 1979, at L 3-4. The directive provides that all such laws shall be in force, save for those
that clearly are in conflict with the Constitution of the PRC or any laws passed or decrees issued
by the Fifth National People's Congress. See Torbert & Thomson, China's Joint Venture Law: A
Preliminary Anaoysis, 12 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 821 (1979).
155 Based on discussions of co-author Afford with Chinese officials, Feb. 1981.
156 Zhonghua Renmin Gunghegua Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Suodeshuifa Shixing Xize
(Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China), approved on December 10, 1980 by the State Council andpromulgated by the
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Venture Law in its brevity and generality, the Joint Venture Income
Tax Law is a mere eighteen articles long. It subjects joint ventures to
tax on net income derived from "production, business and other
sources by branches within or outside the territory of China. . .after
deduction of costs, expenses and losses." ' 7 The basic rate of taxation
is 30%,' 5" but the effective rate, inclusive of the local surtax of 10%, is
33%.1' 9 A further tax of 10% will be withheld on all income the foreign
participant chooses to repatriate, 60 while a refund of 40% of income
taxes paid is available, if the income subject to taxation is reinvested in
a joint venture for a five-year period.1 6 1 Even without the potential
refund, the tax is comparable to the industrial and commercial income
tax to which Chinese entities without foreign investment are subject. 1
62
Joint ventures scheduled to operate for more than ten years are eligible
to receive tax holidays of 100% for their first profit making year,t63 50%
for the second and third such years," 6 and in the case of ventures en-
gaged in such "low profit operations as farming and forestry or located
in remote, economically underdeveloped areas," 15% to 30% for an ad-
ditional ten years. 65
Separate formulae are laid out in the Regulations for computing
taxable income earned from industrial, commercial and service activi-
ties, while "[flor other lines of operations," reference is to be made to
the most appropriate of these three categories. 166 In each instance,
taxable income is defined as the enterprise's income net of permissible
deductions.'67 Permissible deductions include manufacturing, selling
Ministry of Finance on December 14, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Detailed Rules and Regulations].
A translation by Xinhua may be found at CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 53-54.
157 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 1.
158 Id. art. 3. A lower rate is promised for joint ventures searching for and exploiting petro-
leum, natural gas and mineral resources. Id. art. 3.
159 Id. art. 3. Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, art. 3. Local authorities have
the authority to waive part or all of the local surtax.
160 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 4.
161 Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, art. 6. The Tax Law itself does not specify
that the reinvestment must be made in a joint venture.
162 The net income of Chinese entities earning 10,000,uan (approximately $6,000) or more a
year is subject to tax at a rate of 34.5%, plus surtaxes which may run as high as 60%, leading to a
potential effective tax rate of 55.2%. Reynolds, Doing Business with the Peopier Republic of China:
Tax Considerations, 14 INT'L LAW. 49 (Winter, 1980).
163 Income Tax Law, supra note 143, art. 5.
164 Id. art. 5. Losses may be carried forward for as many as five years. Id. art. 6.
165 Id. arts. 8, 9.
166 Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, art. 8.
167 Id.
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and administrative expenses, taxes on sales, 68 wages and certain other
costs of doing business, 169 but explicitly exclude capital expendi-
tures,170 expenditures on the purchase of intangible assets, interest on
capital,17' taxes (other than taxes on sales), 172 penalties, losses covered
by insurance, 173 "donations and contributions other than those for pub-
lic welfare and relief purposes," and more than a very limited amount
of entertainment expenses. 1
74
Depreciation of fixed assets "shall generally be computed on aver-
age by the method of straight line,"' 75 although the joint venture may
seek permission to accelerate depreciation. 76 For purposes of comput-
ing depreciation, the minimum useful life of houses and buildings is
twenty years, "machines and equipment and the facilities for the pur-
pose of production," ten years, and electronic equipment and most
means of transportation, five years. 177 Intangible assets such as "tech-
nical know-how, patent rights, ownership of trade marks, copyright,
ownership of sites and other royalties used as investment" are to be
amortized over ten years, unless alternative periods of use are set.'
78
"Expenses arising during the period of preparation for a joint venture"
may also be amortized, provided not more than 20% of such costs are
deducted in any one year.'
7 9
Accounts are to be maintained on the accrual basis,'10 using First-
In-First-Out (FIFO), shifting average or weighted average.' Raw
materials, finished products, by-products and inventories are to be
computed "according to the cost price."' 82 "Vouchers for accounting,
accounting books and reports" are to be kept in Chinese or in both
Chinese and a foreign language and should be retained for at least
168 Id. "Taxes on sales" here presumably refers to China's Consolidated Industrial and Com-
mercial Tax. See text accompanying notes 286-294 infra.
169 Id.




174 Id. Entertainment expenses are deductible only if "relevant to production and operation"
and then only not "above the quota of three per thousand of the total sale income in the tax year
or above the quota of ten per thousand of the total operational income."
175 Id. art. 10.
176 Id. art. 13.
177 Id.
178 Id. art. 16.
179 Id. art. 17.
180 Id. art. 23.
181 Id. art. 18.
182 .d.
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fifteen years.' 83 In addition, the Regulations acknowledge that an en-
terprise may choose to keep separate books for tax and financial pur-
poses.'8
4
Taxes are to be reported for calendar years"' on annual returns1
8 6
accompanied by "reports on auditing by the chartered public account-
ants registered in the [PRC.' 18 7 Payment is to be made quarterly 8 in
Chinese currency at official exchange rates.'8 9 Foreign tax credits are
available for income tax paid "by a joint venture or its branch against
tax assessed" by the Chinese. 190 The Ministry of Finance has the right
to interpret the tax law and regulations, 191 but amounts in dispute must
be paid before reconsideration is sought from such "higher tax authori-
ties" or before the matter is brought to court. 192 By way of enforce-
ment, the tax authorities have the right "to investigate the financial
affairs, account work, and tax situation" of any joint venture 193-
although they must maintain the confidentiality of such informa-
tion'194 -and the right to impose surcharges 195 for overdue payments.
They may also exact penalties of as much as five times the amount of
tax owed (up to a maximum penalty of 5,000yuan),196 and in instances
of "gross violations," may recommend prosecution under China's new
criminal law. 1
97
The Individual Income Tax
Under the Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC and its imple-
menting Regulations, 19 each individual residing for more than five
183 Id. art. 25.
184 Id. art. 24.
185 Id. art. 7. The Gregorian calendar is to be used.
186 Id. art. 20.
187 Id.
188 Id. art. 15.
189 Id., art. 22.
190 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 16; Pomp, Gelatt and Surrey, The Evohing Tax .Sys-
tem of the People rRepublic of China, 16 TEx. IN'L L.J. 11, 69-77 (1981), provides the best discus-
sion to date of-the creditability of taxes paid in China against U.S. taxes and taxes paid in the U.S.
against Chinese taxes.
191 Fields, Taxation: The People's Republic of China Income Tax Laws, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J.
234 (1981).
192 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 15.
193 Id. art. 12.
194 Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, art. 27.
195 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 13. The surcharge to be assessed for each day in
arrears is one half of one percent of the amount owed.
196 Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, art. 27.
197 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 14.
198 Zhonghua Renmin Gungheguo Geren Suodeshuifa Shixing Xize (Detailed Rules and Reg-
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years in the PRC is subject to tax on his entire world-wide income. 199
Individuals residing in China for less than five years but more than 12
months are subject to tax on income earned in the PRC and income
remitted from abroad to the PRC.200 Persons living in China for less
than one year but 90 days or more, are taxed only on "income gained
within China," '' while those residing in the PRC for less than 90 con-
secutive days are exempt from Chinese income tax.2°2 Income from
wages and salaries is taxed at specified rates ranging from 5% to 45%,2
°3
after a monthly deduction of 800 yuan (approximately $500).204 Given
that the average annual income in the PRC is considerably less than
800 yuan,2°5 the tax, in effect, applies primarily to foreigners. °6 Per-
sonal service income, royalties or rental income is taxed at a flat 20%
rate,207 after specified deductions for residents of the PRC. Income
from interest, dividends, bonuses and other non-exempt sources is as-
sessed at a flat 20% without any deductions.20  Apart from providing
that income tax will be withheld at the source, if possible,2 9 the proce-
dural and enforcement aspects of this law closely approximate those of
the Joint Venture Income Tax Law.2'0
Labor Management Relations
The Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment2 "' set out general standards for deal-
ing with what are described as "labor management problems."' 2  Sub-
ject to these standards,2'3 joint venturers are free to conclude contracts
ulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of
China), approved by the State Council on December 10, 1980 andpromulgated by the Ministry of
Finance on December 14, 1980. (Detailed Rules and Regulationsfor the Individual Income Tax).
A translation by Xinhua may be found at CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 55-56.
199 Id., art. 3.
200 Id.
201 Individual Income Tax Law, supra note 149, art. 1.
202 Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Individual Income Tax Law, supra note 198, art. 5.
203 Individual Income Tax Law, supra note 149, art. 3.
204 Id. art. 5.
205 Personal Incomes in China, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 19-20.
206 Loong, China Leaves Some GreyAreas, FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 26, 1980, at 108. Knowl-
edgeable observers suggest that at present less than 100 citizens of the PRC will be subject to the
Individual Income Tax. Pomp, Gelatt and Surrey, supra note 190, at n.170.
207 Individual Income Tax Law, supra note 148, arts. 3, 5.
208 Id.
209 Id. art. 6.
210 Income Tax Law, note 148 supra.
211 See Labor Management Regulations, supra note 150, arts. 8-11.
212 Id. art. 8.
213 Such standards are subject to interpretation by the State Bureau of Labor. Id. art. 15.
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with "the trade union organization formed in the joint venture,"'214 pro-
vided they implement the "relevant rules and regulations of the Chi-
nese government on labor protection and ensure safety in production
"215 Those contracts, which must be approved by the "labor man-
agement department of the provincial, autonomous, regional, or mu-
nicipal people's government," 216 may address "[m]atters pertaining to
employment [and] dismissal. . . of. . .workers, tasks of production,
wages, awards and punishment, working time and vacation, labor in-
surance and welfare, labor protection and labor discipline."
217
The general standards set forth in the Labor Regulations permit
joint ventures to select workers and staff members "through examina-
tion for their qualifications. '218 Appropriate labor management de-
partments must, however, approve the examinations used, or the
recommendations of local authorities must be obtained.2 19 Those
workers who "fail to meet requirements after training and who are not
suitable for other work," together with "surplus workers," may be dis-
charged according to the Labor Regulations, provided they are given
"compensation." 220 Workers, too, have the right to sever their relation-
ship with the joint venture.221
In addition to setting broad parameters for hiring and firing, the
Labor Regulations spell out wage and benefit standards.222 The wage
level for workers and staff members employed by a joint venture is to
be "120 to 150 percent of the real wages of the workers and staff mem-
bers of state-owned enterprises of the same trade in the locality,"
223
although the venture's Board of Directors has discretion in determining
"wage standards, the form of wages paid, and bonus and subsidy sys-
tems. 224 In terms of benefits, the Regulations require joint ventures to
"pay for the Chinese workers' and staff members' labor insutance,
[and] cover their medical expenses and various kinds of government
subsidies in line with the standards prevailing in state-owned enter-
214 Id. art. 2.
215 Id. art. 13.
216 Id. art. 2.
217 Id.
218 Id. art. 3.
219 Id.
2 20 Id. art. 4.
221 Id. arL 7.
222 Id. arts. 8-11.
223 Id. art. 8.
224 Id. art. 9.
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prises.''22 Any disputes arising between labor and management are to
be resolved "through consultation," if possible,226 and if not, by the
provincial level labor management department through arbitration or
by the people's courts.227
Registration Regulations
The Regulations on the Registration of Joint Ventures Using Chi-
nese and Foreign Investment228 specify various registration require-
ments for joint ventures. The process starts after FICC authorization,
with registration with the General Administration for Industry and
Commerce (GAIC).229 Then, the GAIC "authorizes the administrative
bureaus for industry and commerce in the provinces, municipalities
and autonomous regions" to register the joint venture.230 Subse-
quently, the venture must open an account with the Bank of China23'
and register with the local tax bureau.232 It must give notice to FICC
and the provincial level Administration Bureau for Industry and Com-
merce "within one month after approval by the [FICC]" of proposed
changes, such as moving to a new site, shifting production, increasing,
decreasing or transferring registered capital and extending or cutting
short the term of the venture.23 3 To enable the GAIC and its local
counterparts to enforce the relevant requirements, the Registration
Regulations authorize these bodies to "supervise and inspect" the joint
venture and if need be, warn or fine it "in accordance with the varying
degrees of seriousness in each specific case.""
Foreign Exchange Regulations
The Provisional Regulations for Exchange Control of the PRC,
which took effect on March 1, 198 1,235 endeavor to synchronize all for-
eign exchange earnings and expenditures by routing all transactions in
foreign exchange through accounts in the Bank of China and requiring
the approval of the State General Administration of Exchange Control
225 Id. art. 11.
226 Id. art. 14.
227 Id. Access to the courts is available if either party "disagrees to the arbitration." Id.
228 See, Registration Regulations, supra note 151.
229 Id. art. 2.
230 Id.
231 Id. art. 6.
232 Id.
233 Id. art. 7.
234 Id. art. 10.
235 See Exchange Control Regulations, supra note 152.
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(SGAEC).236 Article 22 of the Exchange Control Regulations requires
that "all foreign exchange receipts" ofjoint ventures "be deposited with
the Bank of China" and that all "foreign exchange disbursements" of
these ventures be paid only "from their foreign exchange deposit ac-
counts."237 A foreign joint venturer is entitled to remit its net profits
after taxes only to the extent that the joint venture's account with the
Bank of China contains the foreign exchange required, and then only if
the SGAEC has approved an application for transfer.238 To ensure
that these restrictions are followed, the Exchange Control Regulations
also require that all joint ventures submit "periodic reports and state-
ments of their foreign exchange business to the SGAEC," which will
have the power to review their activities3 9
The Foreign Exchange Regulations also apply to "staff members
and workers of foreign nationality" employed by joint ventures.240 Ar-
ticle 25 prohibits such persons from remitting or otherwise taking out
of China in foreign currency more than 50% of their "net wages and
other legitimate earnings after tax."241
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS NOT RESOLVED
By THE JOINT VENTURE LAWS
As both Chinese and experienced Western observers understand,
neither the Joint Venture Law, nor those laws and regulations designed
to elaborate various of its terms ultimately do more than provide a gen-
eral framework. 2 It should come as no surprise then, that many
problems remain unresolved, and therefore, will have to be addressed
in the process of negotiating a joint venture agreement.
Certainly, the most significant obstacle to conclusion of a joint
venture in China is the scarcity of foreign exchange.243 This problem,
of course, could not be overcome by the Joint Venture Law or the sur-
rounding legal and regulatory requirements. It can be dealt with only
through creative use of the venture as a means of generating foreign
exchange, directly or indirectly, or by otherwise identifying sources of
hard currency which can be linked or teamed with the venture. Sug-
236 Id. art. 22.
237 Id.
238 Id. art. 24.
239 Id. art. 22.
240 Id. art. 25.
241 Id.
242 Hsia & Haun, supra note 102, at 77-83.
243 Kaulfnan, Euphoria on China Yields to Realism at Trade Seminar, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1980,
at 22, coL 1.
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gestions in this connection are made later in this article.2'
Turning then to some of the other potential stumbling blocks in
the path of the prospective joint venture partner, we would identify the
following considerations, which call for considerable advance
planning.
Living with the Bureaucracy
There is simply no escaping the fact that a joint venture will have
to deal continually with China's large and slow-moving bureaucracy.
Government bureaucrats have much to say, not only about the joint
venture's interaction with the general economy, but also as to the man-
agement of the venture itself. Under Article 6 of the Joint Venture
Law, a joint venture must be governed by its Board of Directors, which
has responsibility over such matters as procurement, production, em-
ployment and marketing.245 This seemingly broad grant of manage-
ment discretion has been significantly constrained by the Labor and
Registration Regulations. According to the Labor Regulations, joint
ventures must negotiate with state controlled labor unions for contracts
that meet prescribed wage and benefit levels and conform with the
rules governing worker welfare, hiring and discharges.246 These con-
tracts are then subject to provincial and local government approval.
247
Under the Registration Regulations, a joint venture must obtain a li-
cense from the local office of the GAIC before it can do business, even
though it has already received FICC approval.248 Amendments to an
approved joint venture agreement and other significant changes in
business operations must pass muster with both the FICC and the
GAIC.
24 9
Of far greater importance than these formal, legal restraints are
those limitations on the autonomy of the Joint Venture's Board which
are certain to result from the entity's inevitable interaction with the
Chinese bureaucracy.250 As experience to date demonstrates, a pro-
spective foreign venture partner's determination will be sorely tested by
having to deal with a welter of bureaucracies, at the central, provincial
244 See text accompanying notes 364-381 infra.
245 See Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 6.
246 See Labor Management Regulations, supra note 150, arts. 3-8, 10, 11.
247 Id. art. 2.
248 See Registration Regulations, supra note 151, art. 2.
249 Id. art. 7.
250 Ludlow, Wf/ho the Boss? After Ten Years They Still Don't Know, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1981, at 14; Garcia, China Trade Optimism Tempered, J. COM., Nov. 4, 1980, at 10.
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and local levels.25 Each of these entities has a defined area of respon-
sibility and competence, which it guards closely. 2 Intra-governmental
coordination is often not in evidence, even when there is no apparent
conflict of objectives or jurisdiction. 3
In many respects, the process of negotiating one's way through this
bureaucratic maze to form a joint venture is good training for what lies
ahead when the joint venture does business in the predominantly state-
controlled Chinese economy. The game starts, in effect, with the pro-
cess of negotiating a joint venture agreement. Here too, there are mul-
tiple players on the Chinese side and much confusion.
For example, the China International Trust and Investment Com-
pany (CITIC) was established in the autumn of 1979 to act as a broker,
matching prospective foreign ventures with suitable Chinese partners
and serving as a general ombudsman in solving the problems that arise
as joint venture arrangements are negotiated.25 4 Yet despite the highly
publicized foreign travels of its Chairman, former capitalist Rong
Yiren,25 5 CITIC's functions so far appear to be peripheral rather than
central, designed as much to reassure foreign investers as to actually
resolve major problems. Established in 1979, the FICC plays a more
substantive role.25 6 Headed by Vice Premier Gu Mu, who has been a
key figure in China's macroeconomic planning,25 7 the FICC has re-
viewed proposed joint venture arrangements with much closer scrutiny
and for a longer period than foreign observers originally considered
would be the case. The FICC has even suggested that changes be made
in joint venture documents." 8 Once the FICC has approved a joint
venture, the relevant documentation 259 must be registered with a third
entity, the GAIC.
260
In addition to these three organizations, which constitute the joint
251 Ludlow, supra note 250, at 14.
252 Id.
253 See Hsia & Hann, supra note 102, at 79-83.
254 Statute of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, adopted by the State
Council and formally issued and made effective on Oct. 4, 1979. A translation by Xinhua is
reprinted in SELLING TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA 297-300 (N. Ludlow ed. 1979); Ling, The Invest-
ment Matchmaker, CHINA TRADE REP., July 1980, at 2.
255 [1979] 278 INT'L TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. ExPoRT WEEKLY (BNA), at C-2.
256 The PRC's Investment Control and Import-Export Commissions, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1980, at 12-13.
257 D. KLEIN & A. CLARK, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 447-448
(1971).
258 Birenbaum & Afford, supra note 3, at 26-27.
259 Joint Venture Law, supra note I, art. 3.
260 Id.
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venture bureaucracy on the national level, there are a growing number
of provincial level entities with at least partial jurisdiction over joint
ventures. These include but are not limited to "the [provincial and lo-
cal] authorities with whom each joint venture's production and busi-
ness programs" must be filed261 and such specialized entities as the
Guangdong Provincial Administrative Committee in Charge of the
Special Economic Zones, the Fujian Investment and Enterprise Corpo-
ration, the Beijing Economic Development Corporation, the Shanghai
Foreign Investment Commission, the Zhejiang Province Overseas Chi-
nese Investment Corporation and the local arms of the GAIC.
262
Problems of bureaucratic coordination are not hypothetical. Pro-
spective joint venturers have been strongly encouraged by central gov-
ernment bureaus, only to learn that a provincial agency is on the verge
of concluding an agreement with a competitor or that basic require-
ments such as power and water are not available.263 Recent efforts at
decentralizing economic responsibility and promoting financial ac-
countability, however shortlived they may be, are a mixed blessing in
this connection. Joint venturers may have more freedom to make deci-
sions formerly reserved to central authorities, but the number of bu-
reaucracies in the act seems certain to increase.
Working with the Chinese Worker
Notwithstanding the Labor Regulations, many questions concern-
ing relations with the Chinese work force remain unanswered. These
questions assume considerable importance because joint ventures are
required to provide salaries for their workers at a level appreciably
greater than workers in comparable Chinese enterprises. 64 This will
reduce the advantage of locating in the PRC compared with elsewhere
in Asia,2 65 although in all likelihood, these premiums will not be passed
along by Chinese authorities to workers in joint ventures.
2 66
The principal problems yet to be resolved concern the selection,
quality, size and control of the work force. Since the Joint Venture
Law was promulgated, Chinese leaders have indicated that joint ven-
tures would be able to draw their workers from a select pool of spe-
261 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 9.
262 Loong, Special Zones, SpecialRules, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 12, 1980, at 56. Guangdong
Sheng Jingji Tequ Tiaoli (Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province).
263 Weil, Technology Transfer, CHINA Bus. Rav., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 21-29.
264 See Labor Management Regulations, supra note 150, art. 8, 11.
265 D. BONAVIA, THE CHINESE 200 (1980).
266 Hsia & Haun, supra note 102, at 77-83(quoting Liu Yaochu).
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cially, trained workers.267 The Labor Regulations do grant joint
ventures the right to choose workers on the basis of tests approved by
local labor management bureaus.2 68 Still, doubts remain as to the
number of reasonably well trained Chinese staff and workers, the will-
ingness of local labor bureaus to make them available for joint venture
enterprises and the nature of the job selection tests to be adminis-
tered.269
The suitability of the available work force is of particular impor-
tance for prospective foreign joint venturers because the West's experi-
ence with Chinese quality control has been mixed. 27° When they buy
abroad, the Chinese have insisted on thorough inspections coupled
with comprehensive representations and warranties, 27' but the Chinese
have been reluctant to provide the same treatment for exports of do-
mestic manufactured goods.272 Recently, however, preshipment in-
spections by foreign buyers have been permitted. These inspections
have proved necessary, as the quality of Chinese manufacturers in
many fields has been uneven and foreign insistence on quality assur-
ance has all too often been ignored by the Chinese.273
Quality control is not the only potential concern. There is an over-
abundance of unskilled Chinese workers or as the Chinese euphemisti-
cally term them, "youth waiting for work" (daiye jingnian).274
Overstaffing and low productivity are serious and widespread problems
particularly for Chinese factory managers who have to account for
profits and losses. 275 The Labor Regulations empower state authorities
to approve virtually every aspect of the labor contracts with the appro-
priate Chinese labor unions, so it is hard to imagine that joint ventures
could somehow escape the employment problems plaguing China.
27 6
267 Based on an interview of Vice Premier Yao Ilin by co-author Alford in Aug. 1979.
268 Labor Management Regulations, supra note 150, art. 3.
269 LaForce, Joint Ventures and Labor Relations: A Preliminary Analysis of China's Joint
Venture Labor Regulations (Jan. 1981) (unpublished paper available through the co-authors).
270 Rosenbaum, Chinese Products Stir Complaints, J. CoM., Nov. 10, 1980, at 1.
271 See, e.g., the purchase contracts typically employed by MACHIMPEX, reprinted in NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE, CHINA'S STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS AND RELATED
LEGAL ISSUES IN U.S.-CHiNA TRADE (Special Report No. 13, 1975).
272 Theroux, Technology Sales to China:" New Laws and Old Problems, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
185, 222-224 (1980).
273 See Rosenbaum, supra note 270, at 1.
274 Vice Premier Li Xiannian reportedly has set the number of unemployed at more than
20,000,000. J. Wang, China'r Jobless Youths: 4 Mounting Problem, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1979,
§F, at 11.
275 Sterba, China Experimenting With Labor Disciline, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1981, § A at 3.
276 LaForce, supra note 269.
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The greatest challenge presented by the employment situation in
China is not one which any legislation or regulation can effectively ad-
dress. It is one familiar to businesspersons everywhere-how to moti-
vate the workforce. Notwithstanding all the claims to the contrary,
Chinese workers are not immune from motivational ailments. Absen-
teeism, low productivity and indifference have been all too evident in
Chinese industry during the past decade.277 The policy of the present
political leadership to provide material incentives, particularly bonuses,
has helped, but the problem remains a serious one. The Labor Regula-
tions authorize joint ventures to deliver bonuses and dismiss work-
ers.278 The effective use of these carrots and sticks to motivate workers
in one of the world's most socialist environments will require excep-
tional management skills.
Unresolved Tax Issues
The Joint Venture Income Tax Law and the Individual Income
Tax Law lay down the basic ground rules and as such, are welcome
complements to the Joint Venture Law. Yet, even when supplemented
by their respective sets of implementing regulations,2 79 each leaves
many questions unanswered both as to the manner in which a joint
venture or foreign national's income will be taxed, the mechanics for
securing one's full rights under the law, and the potential applicability
of other Chinese taxes.
The most obvious questions remaining about the income tax are
definitional and jurisdictional. Such fundamental terms as "costs,"
"losses," "remitted" and "residing" are not fully defined, as a conse-
quence of which it is difficult to compute net income.280 The question
of whether the term "joint venture" should be read to include compen-
sation trade or coproduction agreements that have extensive foreign in-
volvement, if not foreign investment, is unanswered.2 81 A third
outstanding issue involves breadth. For example, the Joint Venture In-
277 Id. at 23-24.
278 Labor Management Regulations, supra note 150, art. 9. Notwithstanding the fact that the
Labor Management Regulations authorize joint ventures to discharge inadequate workers, it is
hard to imagine that foreign-owned enterprises will be able to end the concept of the "iron
ricebowl"--the idea that, once employed, a worker and his factory form a virtually inalienable
bond.
279 See Detailed Rules and Regulations, note 156 supra; Detailed Rules and Regulations for
the Individual Income Tax Law, supra note 198.
280 See Fields, supra note 191, at 238.
281 See Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 1. Recent reports suggest that the Chinese intend
to apply a separate, higher rate of income tax to enterprises in China with considerable foreign
investment that are not joint ventures.
Ventures in the China Trade
3:56(1981)
come Tax leaves unclear its relation to the income tax, to be imposed at
the rate of 15% by the Regulations on Special Economic Zones in
Quangdong Province on joint ventures established in those zones.
28 2
A related problem concerns multiple taxation. Xue Muqiao, the
noted economist whose writings have reportedly had a great influence
upon the current leadership,8 3 recently asserted that the 33% rate es-
tablished by the Joint Venture Income Tax Law might be reduced in
particular cases to avoid excessive, aggregate taxation.284 Yet the rela-
tionship between other Chinese taxes and the special joint venture in-
come tax regime remains unclear, raising the spectre of heavy, multiple
taxation. In addition to the income tax, China has at least ten distinct
taxes, certain of which may apply to joint ventures and their owners.285
The most important is the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial
Tax.216 A composite of four separate taxes, the consolidated tax-akin
to a cascading turnover tax287-- in essence taxes goods and services at
the stages of production and retail sales.288 Calculated on the item's
sales price inclusive of tax, the tax can be passed on to purchasers to the
extent that the state will permit it to be reflected in the item's price.289
Although the rates vary according to the importance of the goods and
services involved29 and the location of the taxpaying enterprise,2 9 1
they can run as high as 66% of an item's value: thereby making the
question of whether it will apply to a joint venture anything but aca-
demic. 292 Preliminary indications from negotiations held thus far are
that contributions from foreign partners will not be subject to the
tax.293 The provision in the Income Tax Regulations permitting the
deduction of taxes on sales does suggest, however, that the products of
a joint venture factory will be subject to this tax, barring a negotiated
282 See Loong, supra note 262, at 56-57; Pomp. Gelatt and Surrey, supra note 190, at 63-66.
283 P. Loong, Capitalising on New Socialism, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 15, 1980, at 40-41.
284 Interview with Xue Magiao, CHINA Bus. REv. 58-60 (July-Aug. 1981); Kramer, Chinese Offi-
cial Says Tax on Earnings of Foreign Investors Likely to be Cut, Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1980, at
5.
285 Pomp & Surrey, The Tax Structure of the People'r Republic of China, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(1979).
286 Pomp & Surrey, supra note 285, at 12-22; Gelatt, The Consolidated Industrial and Commer-
cial Tax: Its Impact on Foreign Investment, 2 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 2 (1980).
287 Gelatt, supra note 286, at 2.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Luxury goods are taxed far more heavily than necessities. Reynolds, supra note 162, at 57-
58.
291 Tax relief is available for entities situated in areas of unemployment. See Pomp, Gelatt &
Surrey, supra note 190, at n.38.
292 Id.
293 Based on co-author Alford's discussions with Chinese officials, Jan. 1980.
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exemption.294
Apart from these substaltive issues, the new tax laws and regula-
tions raise a number of vital concerns of an administrative or procedu-
ral nature. As presently written, neither the law nor the regulations
provides a means to obtain advance rulings or contest tax assessments
prior to making payment.295 This deficiency is accentuated by the
surcharge provisions of the laws. These may be triggered for "failure
to pay within the prescribed time limit," even, apparently, if the tax-
payer is taking issue with or in doubt as to the amount of tax due.2 96
Additionally, the laws and regulations are vague as to a number of
procedural matters of importance to foreign investors, such as tax holi-
days or credits. Taking the former as an example, beyond setting out a
very general standard, little is said about the criteria or methods for
securing tax holidays.297 How, after all, is the determination to be
made that technology provided by a foreign investor is truly advanced
by world standards and appropriate to China's needs, as the Joint Ven-
ture Law says is necessary to take a tax holiday?29 8 How, for example,
is a foreign investor to receive binding confirmation that a tax holiday
will be granted before actually making its investment? What docu-
ments are to be submitted, by whom, to whom, and when? In practice,
answers to many of these questions may be negotiated out between the
parties, but the on-going lack of clear, firm, visible rules in this area
hardly serves as an incentive to prospective foreign partners.
Bringing the Profits Back Home
The Joint Venture Law entitles foreign participants to repatriate
profits earned in China.2 99 Yet potential foreign investors remain con-
cerned over the extent to which this promise will be effected in practice.
As discussed above, China lacks sufficient foreign exchange to under-
take significant foreign procurements, and because of her historical ex-
perience, is reluctant to borrow heavily in foreign markets to finance
imports of Western goods and technology." ° Of late, the central gov-
ernment has come to appreciate the magnitude of this problem and has
intensified its efforts to discourage Chinese and foreign investors alike
294 See Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, art. 8.
295 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, arts. 8, 13.
296 Id. art. 13; Individual Income Tax Law, supra note 149, art. 11.
297 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 7; Income Tax Law, supra note 148, arts. 5, 6; Detailed
Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, arts. 5, 6.
298 Id.
299 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 10.
300 See text accompanying notes 90-108 supra.
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from moving foreign exchange outside of China.3° ' Through the Joint
Venture Income Tax Law,3°2 the Government has imposed an addi-
tional 10% withholding tax upon net earnings repatriated by foreign
joint venture participants, while through the Exchange Control Regula-
tions, it has sought to limit each joint venture's foreign exchange dis-
bursements to its foreign exchange earnings.30 3 Additionally, in its
most important currency conversion action, the Government, in Janu-
ary of 1981, carried out what was effectively the PRC's first devalua-
tion.3 ° Under the new system, the rate of exchange for Chinese state
enterprises and government corporations purchasing foreign currency
to pay for overseas transactions is fixed at 2.8yuan per dollar, although
the rate for yuan received in exchange per foreign dollar earned will
stay at 1.5.305 As a result, China's exports are now more competitively
priced on the world market, but correspondingly, the price of imports
has risen by almost 50%.306 And, notwithstanding protests by Japanese
and other trading partners, the Chinese have continued to cut back
drastically on major projects because of foreign exchange problems.30 7
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights
The Joint Venture Law does not explicitly provide for the protec-
tion of intellectual property. Article 5 of the Law, however, recognizes
that a foreign participant's contribution to a joint venture may be in the
form of intellectual property rights, thereby acknowledging that such
rights are a valued form of property.30 8 Article 2 of the Law asserts
that the Chinese government will respect and protect foreign partici-
pants' legitimate property rights and interests; a category that in light of
Article 5, presumably includes intellectual property rights.30 9
At present, the Chinese lack a comprehensive statutory framework
for the protection of intellectual property rights. To be sure, China has
trademark' 0 and invention laws.3 I t Pursuant to the Law on Trade-
301 Ludlow, China Wire, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 3.
302 Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 4.
303 Exchange Control Regulations, supra note 152, arts. 22-24.
304 Dessertine, In Double Taux de Change, COMITE FRANCE CHINE, Dec. 19, 1980; Ching,
China Confirms Separate Currency Rate to be Set Internallyfor Foreign Trade, Wall St. J., Dec. 16,
1980, at 37.
305 Ching, supra note 304, at 37.
306 Id.
307 See text accompanying notes 109-117 supra.
308 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 5.
309 Id. art. 2.
310 Regulations of the People's Republic of China Governing Trademarks, adopted April 10,
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marks, which was initially issued in 1963, registration and a degree of
protection have been obtained for certain well-known American marks,
such as "The Encyclopedia Britannica. 312 Issued late in 1978, China's
revised Regulations on Rewards for Inventions reward only those in-
ventors who turn their inventions over to the state which then may
make them available to any Chinese entity. 13 As such, the invention
law offers little comfort for potential foreign joint venture participants
seeking to protect their intellectual property rights.
As they have pledged to do in Article VI of their Trade Agreement
with the United States, the Chinese are endeavoring in short order to
put into effect patent and copyright laws that meet the minimal stan-
dards of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 314 To-
ward that end, China joined WIPO in February of 1980.311 In
addition, study groups have gone to Japan, the United States and other
major industrial nations, and patent specialists have been sent to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office for extended stays.316 Even
prior to the promulgation of the Joint Venture Law, it had been antici-
pated that the Chinese would issue laws of their own meeting WIPO
standards and might accede to the Paris Convention.317 They have not
yet done either, but these laws are rumored now to be in the final stage
of drafting.318 It has been suggested that in drafting their patent law,
the Chinese are looking toward the model emanating from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development in their drafting.
319
In the absence of comprehensive laws protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights, the only alternative means of safeguarding such interests is
by so providing in the joint venture agreement. That is difficult to do.
1963. A translation by Xinhua may be found at G. Hsi o, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA 219
(1977). [Hereinafter cited as Hsiao].
311 Regulations on Rewards for Inventions, promulgated Jan. 16, 1979. A translation by
Xinhua is reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, Jan. 18, 1979, at E-15.
312 See Theroux, supra note 272, at 232.
313 See Regulations on Rewards for Inventions, supra note 211; Hsia & Haun, Laws of the
People's Republic of China on Industrial and Intellectual Property, 5 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 743
(1973); Gale, The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People's Republic of Chinra Inventors and
Inventions, 74 CHINA Q. 335 (1978).
314 See S. Landers, Industrial Property Rights in the People's Republic of China (Jan. 1981)
unpublished paper (available through co-authors).
315 China May Adopt Patent Lawfor International Trade, Agence France Press, May 13, 1980,
reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, May 16, 1980, at A-7.
316 Patent Conference Explores InternationalDevelopments, [1980] 460 PATENT, TRADEMARK &
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June 1979, at 28.
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As Western companies are increasingly coming to learn through exam-
ples such as the "708"--supposedly a pirated version of the Boeing
70732 -- China's considerable reputation for honoring foreign patent
rights is not without its exceptions, for which there is little practical
remedy.321 The situation is even more problematic when it comes to
non-patentable technical and managerial expertise.
As experience suggests, the proprietary nature of intangible infor-
mation is one of the more elusive concepts in the Sino-American com-
mercial dialogue.322 This should not be surprising since the upholding
of rights to unpatented know-how can entail barring technicians from
using for the benefit of the state information they obtained from for-
eign sources, even though the information has been fully absorbed in
their general body of knowledge. Such a dichotomy in allegiances is
unlikely to prove acceptable to the Chinese, since it runs counter not
only to Communist ideology, but to traditional Chinese thought, as
well.
323
These problems go beyond the conceptual level. Despite-or,
maybe, because of-the post-Mao opening to the West, China's leaders
continue to worry that excessive reliance on imported equipment will
impair her independence.324 Imports of goods entail greater levels of
foreign debt and dependence on foreign supplies. Present policy favors
the acquisition of technology and know-how, on the theory that this
will enable the next generation to fend for itself.325 Is it little wonder,
then, that the Chinese could, for example, promise to protect the confi-
dentiality of foreign technology imparted to a particular factory's man-
agement, while insisting on the right to rotate chief engineers in order
to disseminate that very technology?
32 6
Living in China
The Joint Venture Law purports to assure that needed foreign per-
sonnel will be able to take up residence in China. The Law, however,
says nothing about the circumstances of their stay. As discussed above,
320 Mathews, China Set to Clone a '708'From Boeing Jet it Bought, Wash. Post, May 9, 1980,
§ A, at I.
321 Id.
322 Landers, supra note 314.
323 Chen Shuhua, It is Entirely Necessary to Establish a Patent System, Renmin Ribao (The
People's Daily), June 19, 1980, r~rintedin FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SnV c , July 9,
1980, at L 1-14.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Based on co-author Alford's discussions with Chinese officials, Feb. 1981.
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the Personal Income Tax Law establishes basic rules of taxation appli-
cable to resident aliens,327 and the Exchange Control Regulations re-
strict the amount of net wages a foreign worker can remit from
China.32 The Consular Agreement between the United States and the
PRC assures Americans residing in China such basic privileges as noti-
fication of the consul within four days of arrest or detention, a visit by a
consular official within two days of notification, and attendence by two
consular officials at any trial in order to provide necessary legal and
translation assistance. 329 Nonetheless, fundamental issues, largely of
an extralegal nature, remain.
The paramount problems concern the basics of living and working
in China as an alien. For example, provision must be made for access
to housing, education, food and medical services at a standard that ulti-
mately will be vastly superior to what is available to Chinese work-
ers.330 Yet every effort must be made to prevent this privileged status
from unleashing a xenophobic reaction. Perhaps a more immediate
threat is the impact on Chinese society of such blatant discrimination in
the provision of material benefits. For as Orville Schell's fascinating
recent study of the underside of China's new openness to the West-
replete with prostitutes, pimps and punks in fedora hats-indicates,
33'
and as the recent regulations restricting the acceptance by Chinese offi-
cials of gifts from foreigners confirm,332 the influence of foreigners resi-
dent in China has not been entirely salutary.
Resolving Disputes with the Chinese Venture Partner
Perhaps to a greater extent than any other single issue in the joint
venture area, the approach to dispute resolution taken in the Joint Ven-
ture Law shows the sway of classical Chinese culture, intensified by
Communist ideology. The Law directs the parties to resolve their dis-
putes through consultation on the bases of "equality and mutual bene-
fit," informal mediation and, as a last resort, formal arbitration.333 No
327 See text accompanying notes 98-227 supra.
328 See text accompanying notes 240-241 supra.
329 Consular Convention Between the United States of America and The People's Republic of
China, Sept. 19, 1980, arts. 3, 35, reprintedat 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1119 (1980). See Cohen
and Gelatt, China: The Foreigner andthe New Criminal Code, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1980, at 4.
330 Sterba, Moving in in China: A Puzzled Isolation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1981, § C, at 1.
331 0. SCHELL, WATCH OUT FOR THE FOREIGN GUESTS (1980).
332 State Council Decision on not Giving or Receiving Gifts in Foreign Affairs Activities,
adopted by the State Council on Nov. 7, 1980. A translation by Xinhua may be found in 2 E.
ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 15, 1981, at 10. See Modernization's Black Side, FAR E. ECoN.
RE., Apr. 4, 1980, at 15.
333 See Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 14.
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mention is made of China's new economic courts.334 This policy effec-
tuates the long-standing Chinese preference for resolution of disputes
informally through compromise, rather than litigation.335 Rarely dur-
ing the past thirty years have trade disputes been referred to arbitra-
tion, let alone litigation, whether in China or abroad.336
The Chinese have agreed in recent years to arbitration clauses
specifying foreign sites, including Stockholm (most often), Geneva,
London and Toronto. 337 Generally, if unable to bring the arbitration
under the rules of China's Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission,
338
the Chinese have indicated a preference for the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce or United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
rules, rather than those of the International Chamber of Commerce, to
which Taiwan still belongs.339
The Information Gap
The Hung-wu Emperor, founder of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1368-
1644), reputedly refused to make public the basic laws regulating the
behavior of his subjects. He thought that by publicizing the laws he
would only encourage those of mean spirit to circumvent them. The
present day successors of the Hung-wu Emperor have retained more
than vestiges of that approach. To be sure, during the past two years
the Chinese government has made unprecedented strides in educating
the public about the basic criminal and other laws that affect their
lives.340 Still, especially in the economic area, the nature and extent of
Chinese law or those rules, regulations and directives having the effect
of law remains shrouded in secrecy.
34'
In part because of foreign persistence, the Chinese government is
now in the process of publishing a compendium of major economic
laws.342 That work is certain to be helpful, yet it will still leave the
334 The role and procedures of these new courts are discussed in Ellis & Shea, Foreign Commer-
cial Dispute Settlement in the Peopler Bs epublic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 155, 168-172 (1980-
81).
335 G. HSIAO, supra note 310, at 154.
336 NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE, ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN
TRADE WITH CHINA (1974).
337 Id.; Rabb, Chinese Policy Seems Moderate In Settling Shipping Disputes, J. COM., Sept. 17,
1980, at 9.
338 Ren Jianxin, Some Legal Aspects of Our Import of Technology and Utilization of Foreign
Investment, I CHINA L. REP. 97-102 (Fall, 1981).
339 Hsia & Haun, supra note 102, at 73.
340 Lubman, supra note 31; Alford, King & Williams, Laws, Lawyers, and Legal Education in
the PRC, KENNEDY INST. Q. 47-49 (1979); Gelatt & Snyder, Legal Education in China: Training
for a New Era, 1 CHINA L. REP. 41-60 (1980).
341 Lubman, China's Joint Venture Laws Leave Questions Unanswered, Asian Wall St. J., Nov.
24, 1980, at 6 (special supplement).
342 Id.
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would-be foreign joint venturer partially in the dark, for it will not
cover provincial, municipal or local legal pronouncements, such as the
rules of the provincial labor management departments. Nor will it
identify internal directives and pronouncements, such as the standards
of review by the FICC of petitions for changes in a joint venture's oper-
ations, which may not be called "law," but will nonetheless be binding
when applied.
STRUCTURING AN APPROACH TO THE CHINESE
The Chinese are well aware of the difficulties facing potential for-
eign investors. To Westerners frustrated with the pace of China's
movement toward more comprehensive and detailed laws in the joint
venture area, they counsel patience: patience while a poor China, with
many competing developmental needs, establishes priorities, patience
while China learns from her experience in obtaining goods and tech-
nology from foreign suppliers and patience while China decides what
further laws and regulations governing joint ventures it is prepared to
adopt, although it is a safe bet they will be neither as many, nor as
specific, as most foreign venturers would desire.343 The Chinese are
right to counsel patience, for without great patience, a foreign company
would be ill-advised to involve itself in a joint venture with the Chi-
nese.
Reasonsfor Investing in China
Given these daunting difficulties, why should a potential joint ven-
turer invest in China? We see four major reasons.
The first is access to China's domestic markets. The image of
more than one billion Chinese hungry for long-denied Western goods
casts a powerful spell. Today's would-be China tycoons, like their
predecessors a century ago, are enthralled by the prospect of "supply-
ing oil for the lamps of China." 3" For the most part, these dreams of
millions of new consumers of jeans and junk food are just that; fanta-
sies which the Chinese cannot now afford.3 45 Yet for entrepreneurs in
the electrical, transportation, energy and agricultural industries, access
to the domestic market through the joint venture mechanism is a possi-
bility worth exploring. These are fields which the Chinese want to de-
velop as part of the new, pragmatic leap forward. Even more
343 Powers, China Interested in Mississopi Crops, says Chinese Ambassador, Jackson Daily
News (Miss.), Jan. 25, 1981, § B, at 4.
344 BONAVIA, supra note 265, at 199.
345 See Kaufman, supra note 243 at 22.
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importantly, such projects have the potential for generating foreign ex-
change through exports.
A second rationale is to exploit the growing market for tourism.
Here, too, the objectives of the Chinese and the foreign investor are
congruent. The commercial prospects are encouraging. In 1980, the
number of foreign visitors to the PRC soared to almost 6,000,000;346
and this despite increases in hotel, food and related travel prices that
have run ahead of China's official 6% inflation rate.3 47 The foreign
business and journalistic communities have been other sources of busi-
ness for hotel, office and similar projects.348
Many of the joint venture proposals that have received serious
consideration involve tourism in one way or another. Three of the first
five joint venture proposals approved by the FICC seek to tap this
growing market. The most noteworthy of these ventures was the agree-
ment between E-S Pacific Development and the China International
Travel Service to build and operate a flagship, international-class hotel
in Beijing to be known as "The Great, Wall."
349
China's massive but largely untapped raw material wealth pro-
vides a third attraction for American companies. To be sure, the no-
tion that China would soon become a large-scale exporter of oil has
faded in the face of domestic political wrangling,35 ° production short-
falls 351 and the disappointing composition of Chinese oi.352 Indeed,
recent reports suggest that the Chinese are trying to import oil to keep
major petrochemical projects alive.353 Still, to the capitalist world,
which has seen supplies of tin, manganese, tantalum, tungstun and
many other critical metals and minerals dwindle or come under the
control of unstable third world suppliers or cartels, China's vast min-
eral reserves retain a powerful attraction, particularly since Western
technology would be of great value to the Chinese in extracting those
346 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China, Communique on Fulfillment of
1980 National Economic Plan, issued April 29, 1981 by the State Statistical Bureau, reprinted in
BEUING REv., May 18, 1981, at 17.
347 Kramer, Currency-Starved Chinese Charge Visitors Whatever Market Will Bearfor Services,
Wall St. J., July 25, 1980, at 34; Modernization's Black Side, supra note 332 at 15.
348 China Trade Projects Hard to Come By, J. COM., Nov. 19, 1980, at 1.
349 See Birenbaum & Alford, supra note 3.
350 Breeze, Safet First in Industry, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Oct. 10, 1980, at 61; Petroleum Minister
Ousted in China, J. COM., Aug. 20, 1980, at 2.
351 O & Coal- .4 New Shockerfrom Peking, ASLAWEEK, Feb. 27, 1981, at 43.
352 Alford, Practical and Legal Problems of Doing Business with China (Sept. 27, 1979) (speech
delivered at the Federal Bar Association Annual Convention, San Antonio, Texas). Most Chinese
petroleum has such a high paraffin content that it would be unsuitable for the American or Euro-
pean markets without additional, costly refining.
353 AsiAwEEK, supra note 351.
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natural resources.354 Again, the crucial foreign exchange problem is
potentially soluble, at least in principle and over time.
The fourth, and for many the most alluring appeal of joint ven-
tures in China is the Chinese people and their tremendous potential as
a labor force to produce goods for export markets. During the past
three years, numerous foreign concerns have entered into compensa-
tion, countertrade, processing or related agreements with the Chi-
nese.3 5 - Pursuant to these agreements Chinese workers engage in the
assembly of products for the export market. Payment is made in goods
or from export earnings. Despite labor, quality control and infrastruc-
ture problems, many of these projects have proved profitable for both
sides.356 For the Chinese, they offer Western capital, technology, man-
agerial expertise and a new source of jobs, at tolerable foreign ex-
change costs. For the Western venture partners, the main attraction is
relatively inexpensive labor and, in certain cases, raw materials.
Without a greater willingness by foreigners to purchase Chinese
products, however, the promise will not be realized. The United States
and other nations eager to promote their trade with China have been
reluctant to accept imports of Chinese manufactured goods in volumes
comparable to their exports to China.3 57 In the United States, this
problem is most graphically illustrated by the resistance to imports of
textile products. In spite of the fact that the Chinese are now the larg-
est purchaser of cotton exported from the United States, 358 the United
States government, succumbing to domestic political pressure, insisted
upon rigid limitations upon Chinese textiles in the bilateral textile
agreement negotiated in 1980.151 Yet if China cannot earn through ex-
ports the foreign exchange needed to pay for Western high technology
and advanced equipment, the prospects for substantial trade with
China are not bright.
354 Crown, China Markets First Tungsten Powders in U.S., Amer. Metal Mkt., Aug. 27, 1981;
Jabs, Chinese Offer to Sell U.S. Three Strategic Metals, Am. Metal Mkt., Sept. 15, 1980, at 1.
355 P. VERZARIU, COUNTERTRADE PRACTICES IN EAST EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION AND
CHINA (1980). Chinese countertrade transactions are listed at 98-102.
356 Kurata, Lower Costs Lure China Trades, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 27, 1981, at 68.
357 Goldsmith, Protectionism.- Several U.S. Industries Form A Front in Washington Against Bur-
geoning Chinese Imports, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 19.
358 The Chinese purchased more than $700 million in U.S. cotton in 1980. George, Gullo &
Stein, Trade with the People's Republic of China: Current Status and Future Prospects, 3 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 21 (1981).
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Selecting the Right Venture Partner
Having considered the reasons for engaging in a joint venture with
the Chinese, the prospective foreign investor must next determine
which Chinese enterprise to approach about a possible collaboration.
CITIC stands ready to assist in this matching process. 360 Experience
suggests, however, that CITIC's objectives may not always parallel
those of the prospective foreign joint venturer. Indeed, although
China-hands are reluctant to publicly voice criticism of CITIC, some
caution that CITIC has tried to direct foreign investment to locales in
China in need of development projects even if they lack the necessary
infrastructure or utilities, or are less than ideal from a strictly commer-
cial vantage point.
Instead of depending solely on CITIC, a potential foreign investor
would be well advised to conduct or commission the research necessary
to identify appropriate Chinese venture parties. Approaches can then
be made to the entities in question and to the concerned provincial and
national governmental units. Notwithstanding the greater autonomy
granted of late to local enterprises and governing units, any joint ven-
ture with a value of more than 3 millionyuan is likely to require from
an early stage onward at least the tacit approval of higher authori-
ties.361 As a consequence, prospective joint venturers will enhance
their chances of attracting attention to their proposal and subsequently
securing approval for it by reaching out broadly from the beginning.
Negotiating Strategy-Overcoming
the Foreign Exchange Barrier
The core of any effective strategy in negotiating with the Chinese
is to identify the wants and needs of the Chinese side and to develop
proposals which match their interests with those of the Western venture
partner. This will require an understanding of Chinese development
priorities and the other factors that, as discussed above, shape her atti-
tude to foreign investment. Key elements in this analysis are arranging
suitable sources of foreign exchange and developing an appropriate
structure for the relationship between-the parties.
Projects which promise to generate foreign exchange in the near
term by means of export sales present something of a solution to this
problem. There are numerous examples of successful assembly shop
360 Comments of Rong Yiren at Washington Hilton Hotel, Oct. 9, 1979.
361 Terry, More Power to the Cities: An Interview with Vice fayors of Be(ing and Shanghai on
the Expanded Rule of Municoalites in Foreign Trade, CHINA Bus. Rav., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 18.
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operations-basically, contracted Chinese labor-which involve hiring
Chinese workers to put together parts manufactured outside of China,
such as in Hong Kong, for sale of products in the domestic, tourist or
export markets.362 These ventures, which do not entail equity invest-
ment in China and thus are not carried out through a joint venture as
that term is defined in the Joint Venture Law, have become fairly com-
mon, particularly in Guangdong and Fujian, with overseas Chinese en-
trepreneurs.363 For example, Millie's Holdings Ltd. of Hong Kong has
in recent years supplied the Chinese with equipment and materials
made in Hong Kong to facilitate the manufacture of textiles, shoes and
handbags in the Shenzhen special export zones located close by the
Hong Kong border.36 To take a variant, Reynolds Tobacco is supply-
ing the Amoy Cigarette Factory with processed tobacco and the neces-
sary machinery to produce Camel filter cigarettes for sale in China
Friendship Stores, which serve tourists and the resident foreign com-
munity.365 At a somewhat more complex level, in late 1980 Westing-
house and Combustion Engineering signed an agreement with the First
Ministry of Machine Building under which they will, at least at the
outset, supply the Chinese with the bulk of parts needed for 600-mega-
watt thermal turbine generators and boilers.366 These parts will then be
assembled by Chinese labor, together with other Chinese produced
parts, for sale by the Chinese, largely in the PRC.367 Such projects ulti-
mately present limited possibilities, however, in that the foreign party
lacks control over the work performed in China, does not participate in
any profits earned in China and enjoys only indirect access to the do-
mestic Chinese market. Further, not all enterprises can be carried out
in this fashion: international class hotels and steel mills are ventures
which are too complicated to be contracted out and require substantial
hard currency financing.
An intermediate approach between merely assembling torelgn-
made parts and a full-fledged joint venture is that of counter or com-
pensation trade.368 Here the Western party makes an investment in the
form of technology or equipment, and is paid, in whole or in part, in
the products produced by the Chinese. Usually, these are the direct
362 See Kurata, supra note 356 at 68.
363 Id.; Kamm, Exporting Some of Hong Kong ... Exporting Some of China, Guangdong
SEZS, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 28.
364 See Kurata, note 356 supra.
365 Weil, supra note 263, at 68.
366 Id. at 25-26.
367 Id.
368 VERZARIU, supra note 355, at 1-14 and 19-33.
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products of the invested technology or equipment, which are then sold
on the world market for hard currency. For example, Container Trans-
port, Inc. (CTI) of White Plains, New York entered into an agreement
with the Chinese National Machinery Import and Export Corporation
(MACHIMPEX) in February of 1979 to help the Chinese build a fac-
tory in Canton capable of producing more than 10,000 twenty-foot
equivalent containers per year.369 In return for its assistance, CTI ob-
tained the exclusive right of first refusal to buy a minimum of 50,000
containers at a fixed price over a five year period from the plant.37°
Similarly, the Chinese are now producing landing-gear doors in China
for McDonnell Douglas, thereby acquiring needed technology and, in
effect, giving McDonnell Douglas a prototype of what a joint venture
with the particular Chinese entity might be like at a low cost to all
involved.371
A variation on this theme involves marketing a different product
and possibly utilizing a marketing company on the foreign side of the
transaction.372 This was the approach of one Australian firm which
proposed to exchange prefabricated hotel rooms with the Chinese for
frozen and canned foods (in addition to blocks of hotel reservations).373
The more players, of course, the greater the complications.374
The counter trade concept has been put into practice in the context
of trade with several Eastern European countries. 375 It has been used
in various transactions with China calling for the exchange of such
items as fishing trawlers for shrimp and fish, electronic watch machin-
ery for watches, knitting and sewing machines for textile products and
the machinery to manufacture road building equipment for cement
spreaders.376
Countertrade, however, has certain built-in limitations. Such ar-
rangements may cross bureaucratic lines, making it necessary to obtain
approvals from several ministries which may have conflicting inter-
369 Jones, Four Marine Container Agreements Cause Competition Socialist Style, CHINA Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 47; Kraar, A U.S. Company' Risk-Proof China Deal, FORTUNE, Mar. 23,
1981, at 95.
370 Kraar, supra note 369, at 96; Cohen & Nee, China: Al/About Compensation Trade (Pt. II),
Asian Wall St. J., July 4, 1979, at 4.
371 Id.
372 VERZARIU, supra note 355, at 57-59.
373 Id.
374 Vezariu, Countertrade, Bus. AM., Sept. 8, 1980, at 11-12.
375 VERzARiu, supra note 355, at 34-48 and 78-97.
376 Id. at 98-102.
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ests.3 77 By definition, there is no continuing investment in an enterprise
in China. Countertrade offers limited direct access, at best, to the do-
mestic Chinese market. And, in at least some instances, the Chinese
bureaucracy is seeking to increase foreign exchange earnings by requir-
ing Chinese factories to pay in foreign currency for the goods obtained
from other Chinese factories that would be used as barter with foreign-
ers, on the theory that these items could otherwise be sold directly to
foreign purchasers.378 Finally, countertrade is probably unsuitable for
large projects that involve substantial management responsibilities, ex-
ternal financing and long lead time before revenue is generated.
If one or more of these problems is present, the joint venture mode
may offer a better alternative. If so, it will be up to the prospective
Western partner to devise a means to circumvent the foreign exchange
problems. This may mean selecting projects--such as tourism-which
are capable of generating foreign exchange, involving overseas and lo-
cal Chinese investors who hold Rmb received as compensation for na-
tionalizations,3 9 securing low interest foreign development or export
bank financing, devising methods of reducing foreign exchange ex-
penditures of the Chinese or arranging back-to-back marketing
schemes selling Chinese raw materials or manufactures unrelated to the




Issues of style or approach take on great importance in negotia-
tions with the Chinese. Anxious to maintain bureaucratic caution, ea-
ger to sort carefully and comparatively through the raft of foreign
proposals put forward lest China's limited foreign exchange holdings
be wasted, and wary about unfamiliar Western business ways, China's
trade negotiators generally have proceeded at a pace with an eye for
detail many American businesspersons have found difficult, if not frus-
trating.38 ' Yet patience and a sensitivity that should not imply a lack of
firmness are indispensible to avoid succumbing to less than desired
terms and to engender confidence in the Chinese, who will take the
manner of the negotiations as evidence of the Western party's sincerity.
Such a negotiating style will contribute importantly toward developing
377 Goldsmith, The Uncertain Winds of Countertrade, CHINA Bus. REV., Jul.-Aug. 1980, at 30-
31.
378 Based on discussions of co-author Alford with Chinese officials, Feb. 1981.
379 Roselle, Local Leaders May Aid China Ventures, Asian Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1981, at 12.
380 Birenbaum & Alford, supra note 3, at 26.
381 Theroux, supra note 272, at 210-213.
Ventures in the China Trade
3:56(1981)
a backlog of goodwill to buttress the still weak formal legal protections
available and to facilitate conclusion of a comprehensive agreement.
That an ill-conceived approach can spell failure is evidenced viv-
idly by the experience of one of the first American multinationals to
conclude a major deal with the Chinese in the charged atmosphere of
the commercial breakthrough of the late 1970's. Enthralled by their
success in reaching a tentative understanding about a multimillion dol-
lar venture, the American company ignored the stated desire of the
Chinese to keep their agreement confidential while the Chinese clari-
fied details and secured further internal approvals, and instead called a
press conference to announce their triumph to the world, only to have
the Chinese react bitterly by cancelling the agreement. This unfortu-
nate story is not unique.
Writing it All Down
Notwithstanding the spurt of activity on the legal front in recent
months, the PRC's codified economic laws and legal institutions are at
most still in a formative stage and as such, provide an unfamiliar set-
ting for foreign businesspersons accustomed generally to operating in
more established and accesssible legal contexts. Ironically, the relative
absence in China of an on-going and transparent commercial legal sys-
tem-the absence of which may be attributable in part to the tradi-
tional Chinese skepticism about formal law--dictates that even greater
attention be paid to drafting careful and comprehensive legal instru-
ments than would ordinarily be the case in transnational transactions.
In essence, the new and as yet untested and incomplete commercial
legal context mandates that any joint venture agreement with the Chi-
nese address all imaginable concerns and, in effect, create its own set of
rules. The alternative is to leave unarticulated problems to be resolved
by unclear and uncertain standards.
The post-contract conduct of the Chinese strongly supports a strat-
egy of getting it all in writing. Foreign parties who have failed to press
for comprehensive coverage of their positions in their contracts have
learned that accordingly they may have less than full protection. Other
foreigners have found the Chinese willing, through the vehicle of com-
mercial contracts, to grant tax and other concessions that are not publi-
cized in existing laws or elsewhere.3"2 Ultimately, to paraphrase one of
China's Vice Premiers, China's joint venture law is largely what the
382 See Hsia & Haun, s'upra note 102, at 79-83; BusINEss WrrH CHINA (N. Wang ed. 1980) at
14-15.
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venture partners agree, contractually, to make it.3 83
CONCLUSION
At the end, we come back to our beginning. The extreme swings
in Western attitudes toward China are no basis on which to make an
important commercial decision concerning investment in that country.
In the final analysis, the real China changes less than does China's im-
age in the minds of her many Western suitors. Only by coming to un-
derstand the enduring continuities in Chinese thought and experience
can one begin to assess what is truly changing in China. So despite the
alternating moods of extreme enthusiasm and deep despair, the attrac-
tion of doing business in and with China remains; but only if the busi-
ness serves China's needs as well as those of the prospective investor,
and only if a prospective investor has the commitment, determination
and understanding of China required to overcome the many and inevi-
table problems which lie ahead. Updating Confucius, only he who by
understanding the Old can gain knowledge of the New is fit to meet the
challenge of investing in China's future.
38
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